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Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND
The importance of studying State politics in India as Myron Weiner
has noted, "...is so evident that the case hardly needs to be argued...."
He further pointed out that the "...importance of the study of regional
politics as part of the study of political development in underdeveloped
areas is so apparent that here, too, the case is clear." This is par-
ticularly significant and has acquired added importance in view of the
fact that political power in post-Nehru India is "passing into the hands of
the new regional leaders. .." at the State level.
Marshall Windmiller has rightly pointed out that "Andhra makes an
interesting case study for several reasons."3 Two of his reasons were
that Andhra was the first state to be set up in response to linguistic
agitation, and that in spite of its linguistic homogeneity the State was
cursed with caste and regional tensions. It was Hugh Tinker who pin-
pointed Andhra, as a state 'where the fight between the Communist and the
Congress parties has been particularly bitter: here again, the division is
largely based on the rivalry between dominant castes, the Kammas and Reddis.
Referring to Andhra he pointed out that "group politics had, by the early
1960s, begun to take group leaders from the State to the summit of national
power."5
As Tinker observed, the State of Andhra Pradesh has been active on the
Indian scene in group politics as well as in agricultural production since
1960. And it is also certain of Andhra Pradesh replacing the Uttar Pradesh
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2at the Center in playing the latter' s dominating role in Indian politics.
This has been already seen since the early 1960s—since then two of Andhra
leaders have become president of the All India Congress party, the chair-
man of the All India Swatantra party hails from Andhra politics, and the
All India Jan Sangh had its president from Andhra during 1962, and of course
the rank and file of the Communist party in India comes from Andhra. All
these parties since 1960 held their national executive meetings or working
committee conferences in Andhra Pradesh one year or the other.
Besides, geographically Andhra Pradesh has some significance, in that it
is centrally placed and serves as a link between the Northern and Southern
parts of the country, and East and West of India mingles at its capital
city. Further, it includes an extensive coastal territory whose strategic
importance is bound to increase in the course of time, politically and
otherwise. For it is the people in the coastal areas who generally attain
a high level of political consciousness. The recent view of some of the
legislators from Andhra over the Center's apathy towards the State's needs
was that the North Indian leaders were afraid of Andhra becoming "strong"
and playing a "dominating role."
Andhra Pradesh, in a way is "twice born." With the nation-wide 1956
States reorganization, the State of "Andhra Pradesh," as it exists today was
founded by merging the nine Telengana districts of the then existing Hyderabad
State with the "Andhra State," comprising seven Circar and four Rayalaseema
districts. At that time, Andhra—the "Pandora's Box" in redrawing the Indian
map—itself was only three years old, having been carved out of the multi-
3lingual Madras State after a State-wide agitation in 1952-53. Neither the
Andhra nor the Telengana area had ever been a separate entity in itself.
However, in 1917 the All India National Congress for the first time considered
Andhra by itself a separate "Provincial Committee # .
Past elections in Andhra Pradesh, as it exists today, have had both
significance and importance in Indian politics. It was only in the 1962
third general elections that both Andhra and Telengana areas went to the
polls together in respect of the Assembly elections. For a closer look
until that time, both areas have to be viewed separately, though for Lok
Sabha elections they jointly participated in the second general election
in 1957.
When the first general election took place in 1951, Circar and
Rayalaseema districts were with the Madras State, and Telengana was a part
of Hyderabad State. The Andhra State issue dominated the electioneering of
the first elections. The separate linguistic state issue contributed to
the strengthening of the Communist party in the areas of Circars where the
movement for a separate state was first moved. In Andhra areas the fight
in the elections was triangular—between the Congress, the Communists, and
Prakasam K.M.P.P. and Ranga K.L.P. Prakasam and Ranga— the two powerful
leaders of Andhra (1947-57) contributed to the weakening of the Congress
party by their defections from the Congress party and establishing the
K.M.P.P. and K.L.P. respectively. The Communists, capitalizing on the
Andhra state issue, came out of the elections with 41 seats, and Congress
only 40, in a total strength of 140 seats for Andhra areas in the Madras
Assembly. In the Telengana areas of Hyderabad State, the Communists managed
to capture 45 seats out of 175 by uniting with the influential local
leaders like the late Dr. Jaisurya, brother of West Bengal Governor Miss
Padmaja Naidu.
As a result of the first general elections, no one party won a
clear majority in the Madras Assembly. The non-Congress legislators
numbering 223 as against 152 for Congress, elected Andhra veteran Tanguturi
Prakasam as their leader and formed the government for composite Madras
State. But the Prakasam ministry did not continue for more than a year.
After the first general elections, there was a considerable interest,
in view of the Communists gaining strength, in the probable political
composition of a potential Andhra State. "Political opponents of the Con-
gress pointed out that redistribution of States on linguistic lines would
weaken the hold of the Congress party in the South India where opposition
parties, and especially the Communists, had won significant election
victories. 7 Contrary to this view, however, as the fourth general election
of 1967 also was over, it was Andhra Pradesh that proved the existance of
a powerful Congress ministry in the South India, as the Madras State
also has gone out of the Congress party hands.
Soon after the first election, the linguistic agitation for a separate
Andhra State was mounted and ultimately ended with the ugly climax in the
death of Potti Srlramulu in October, 1953, and the announcement for forma-
tion of a separate State of Andhra followed it.
Thirteen months after the coalition ministry formed by Prakasam as
first Chief Minister of the newly formed Andhra State in 1953, it was brought
5down on a motion of no-confidence on the Issue o£ prohibition.
Following the no»con fidence motion, elections for a new legislature
were held in February 1955. these elections of Andhrs vera attached ail
Indie significance as the Cctrammist party was expected to form the next
Audhra Ministry. The Congress party, with Prime Minister Nehru, AICC
pres A'.r.t Debhar's campaigning m<& 8. K. Patil supervising, centered its
campal -n upon the issue of ceesmmiair. as a danger to democracy and won the
election vith a significant majority.
The important feature of these 1955 elections was the way Congress
fought the elections, as the combined opposition parties fought against the
Congress In 1967 elections, by jolrvng hands with the KLP (Range) and Praja
Party (Prakasam) as United Congress Front. This was, as pointed out by
Fisher and Bcndurant, "one assure of the uneasiness over Communist
strength' that led to the Congress party's agreement to support the KLP
and Praja Party candidates in 49 constituencies*
The oth r parties whe contested the alec tie- —PSP, Communists, and
Socialists—all campaigned vigorously but independently, while the Congress
»
KLP, and Praia Party jointly a* bill»«*d their men and material and campaigned
together. The total nuraber of seats in the Andhra Assembly meanwhile was
increased from 140 to 196 following the delimitation of the constituencies.
The united C I Front contested for all the seats except five, while
the Communists contested for 169 eerts as against 63 seats they had contested
in the 1951 first general election.
The Congress came out of the elections, using all their strategies,
with a resounding victory, obtaining 9C seats »b against 33 in 1951, and
6on the other hand Communists were "surprisingly defeated." As against 41
seats in 1951, they secured only 15 seats. The KLP which later joined the
Swatantra party after two more brief interludes with the Congress party,
increased its strength from 12 to 21. The KLP's support to the Congress
party was the significant factor that led to the striking success of
Congress at the polls over the strong Communist forces in the State.
The major development that took place before the 1957 nation-wide
second general elections was the integration of Telengana areas with the
Andhra, naming the new State as Andhra Pradesh instead of earlier Andhra
State, following the State reorganization. In the 1957 general elections
Andhra areas elected their representatives only to the Lok Sabha as the
elections to the State Assembly were just then held in February, 1955, where-
as the Telengana areas elected their representatives both for Assembly and
for Lok Sabha.
Thus for the Circars and Rayaleseema, the third general elections of
1962 were held after a seven year period, as the term of the 1955 raid-term
members of the Andhra legislative Assembly was extended by two years so
as to be coterminous with the rest of the country and Telengana legislators.
Chapter ZZ
THE SETTING
The fourth general elections In Indie have a special significance In
many ways unlike the earlier elections* These fourth general elections
were held in a tense atmosphere of uncertainty and under the feeling of
lustration and disappointment. Anxiety was expressed in certain Western
quarters over the failure of democracy in India.
The scene after the 1962 general elections presentsan Interesting
picture of stability and change both at the Center and in the State. The
pre-election situation for the fourth general election in the State of
Andhra Pradesh was no better than in any other State in the country.
Student's unrest was the most coraacn scene for two aonths, agitations over
increased food-bills and taxes, Coraaunist-led trade union strikes, Congress-
led trade union demands,Andhra Bhand and satyagraphae , hunger strikes, all
reached the high pitch of 1952. Andhra Pradesh simply reminded the nation
and its leaders at the helm of affairs rfvhat had happened in 1953 over the
linguistic state agitation* State wide agitation over the "steel plant
issue" starting from the State capital Hyderabad to Vlsag via Surnool,
Bellcore, Guntur, Vijayavada, aajahamundry towns and vice versa, and finally
all ended with 32 deaths and a few days standstill of normal life in the
State. That was the state of affairs in pre-election Andhra Pradesh.
But to this staggering discontent among people over economic condi-
tions, changing and often confusing conditions in the political scene were
also added. Significant in the all-India setting was that there was no
longer the charismatic personality of Nehru to act as the biggest vote-
getter for the Congress party. The increased defections from the Congress
party at the all India level besides the bitter group rivalries and factions
within it further confused the state of affairs. The more widespread open
accusations between the two factions of the Communist Party, the unsuc-
cessful agitation of the Swatantra Party over the increased land revenue,
Jan Sangh's little inspired cow agitation, and increased activity of the
Xthehadul Muslim Majlis Party in the capital city, all added to the confusion
of the pre-election setting in the st&te thus making it easy to the "best
exploiter" to exploit the situation.
A look at the composition of the State Assen.bly before it was dis-
solved for entering the election arena may provide a picture of the parties
and where they stood. The Party-wise positions in the legislative Assembly
soon after the 1962 elections and just before the 1967 elections (before
the mass resignations of opposition parties) vas as follows:
Soon After Just before
Party the 1962 the 1967
Election Election
Congress 177 215
Communists (R)
51
32
Communists (L) 22
Jvatantra 19 15
S.S.P. 2 2
Independents 51 10
Nominated 1 1
Vacancies «»m 4
*As seen free* the Cable, the Congress party was able to Increase its
strength frera 177 to 215 by admitting 35 members frets Independents and
Svatantra group and by winning t-.ee* seats in byelections. The Coggaunists
were also able to increase their total strength by three seats by taking
into their fold those independents who vers elected with their support
in 1962, whereas the Sw&tantra lost four of its membere to the ruling
party, one of the® in a byelection.
Of the 31 'Ii t "indents 1 there were at least three parties which were
not recognised by the Election Commission, However, one o£ them, the National
Democratic party, was recognised by the Speaker of the Assembly, The
"Independents" in the Assembly could be further divided as follow*;
Soon After Just Before
Party the 1962 the 1$67
Election Ejection
National Democratic 33 6
Praja Party i 1
Majlis Ithehadui Muslim 1 1
lac pendents (nt attached
L° m: pycty), *6 I .
It is interesting to note how the 51 ©amber strength of the f -
called independents hsA gone down to ton as the Assembly concluded. Of
those 16 independents who were not members of any party in the beginning,
three had joined the Ccoauniet gr<up and eleven joined the Congress. The
two lone members of the Praja Party and Haj lis Ithehadui Muslim iiad not
yielded to any other party in the Assenbly or outside.
The National Democratic Party was only a conglomeration of disgruntled
Congressmen and a few powerful individuals from different regions elected in
10
the 1962 elections as independents. During 1965 the 27 member group led
by Dr. K. V. Narayana Reddy, a leading member of Osmania University
Syndicate and one time professor there, joined the Congress Party in the
Legislature as associated members, and later in early 1966, they were ad-
mitted as full-fledged members of the Congress party by the AICC at the
initiation of the Chief Minister Kasu Brahmananda Reddy (Kaus) and at the
recommendation of the PCC.
As long as Sanjeeva Reddy was in the State as Chief Minister, this
group of National Democrats led by Dr. Reddy did not evince interest to
join the Congress ranks. It was only when Sanjeeva Reddy resigned as Chief
Minister in line with the Supreme Court strictures against him for his
conduct on the bus transport nationalization issue, that Dr. K. V. Narayana
Reddy took the initiative. Kasu Brahmanada Reddy (Kaus) who succeeded
Sanjeeva Reddy as Chief Minister, also took similar interest to strengthen
his own position in the party and particularly in Telengana areas from
where the Dr. Reddy group mostly hails. When Sanjeeva Reddy was All India
Congress President during the period of the 1962 elections, some of the mem-
bers of the National Democratic group who applied for Congress tickets were
refused by him.
The Andhra Pradesh Assembly was free from the ".
.
.disorders and un-
pleasant scenes which had become a regular feature in some of the legisla-
tures.. •" in India, as the Speaker of the House himself said. 12 However,
incidents of adjourning the House when uproarious scenes were witnessed
and ordering members of the opposition to withdraw from the House when this
never happened in earlier Assemblies, were not unusual particularly during
the last two sessions before the 1967 elections.
11
As the election dates drew nearer, the Opposition parties, collectively
and individually played different "games" to capture the mood of the people
through various issues but only unsuccessfully. The second motion of
no-confidence after the 1962 elections on the Congress ministry was tabled by
all the Opposition parties and independents unitedly just before the members
of the House rushed back to their respective constituencies to begin their
electioneering. But when their combined attempt failed to draw the attention
of either the press or the public in the State through the no-confidence
motion, it was necessary, naturally, to look for another issue through Which
to approach the electorate.
The ultimate strategy they used was to resign from the Assembly en
bloc . All the members of the Right Communists, Left (Marxist) Communists,
Swatantra, the remaining group of the National Democratic party, SSP and three
independents, in all, 69 members resigned from their membership. Thus when
the Andhra Pradesh Assembly met for the last few days before adjourning
sine diem from November 19 to 21st, it functioned without any members
on the Opposition benches except a lone member of Majlis Ithehadul Muslim,
Owaisi Salaludhin.
To stir the masses it was necessary to take up some popular issue on
which to resign and mark the beginning of their combined anti-Congress
election campaign. The issues selected were the "steel plant", rising
prices, increased dearness allowance to employees, and making Telugu as
the official language of the State. One of the resigning members,
Vandemataram Ramachendra Rao, also added to the above the "cow protection"
issue and the government's apathy towards that issue. The Communist
12
members of Lok Sabha from Andhra Pradesh—both Right and Left—also
resigned from their Lok Sabha membership in protest against the Congress
government's attitudes towards the steel plant issue. However, the
Opposition parties as they entered for electoral alliance talks could not
keep up the unity they exhibited in the last Assembly session in criticising
the government.
One of the salient features of the fourth general elections was that
unlike past elections, the results were announced only after polling in
all the constituencies ended. This way the Election Commission did a
good service for this will certainly shield the voters at large from casting
their votes in accordance with changing moods and election atmosphere.
This method will eliminate the possibility of the election result in one
constituency, whether it be a neighboring constituency or a constituency of
a local leader or a prestige contest, influencing and affecting the poll
in others.
The old method of counting and announcing the polling result soon
after it was over, when viewed from the fact that the elections were held
in alternative of two or three days will indicate the extent of possible
influence over the next door electorate.
The most important pre-election activity that attracts, if they are
alert, many MLAs and those aspiring candidates is the Delimitation Commis-
sion. After each decennial census a Delimitation Commission is set up
under a Parliamentary statute. Accordingly, the Delimitation Commission
was set up for revision of the number of seats for State Assembly, Council
and Lok Sabha according to the 1961 census. The 1962 general elections
13
were conducted on the basis of the 1951 census. Under this new allocation
of Lok Sabha seats, Andhra Pradesh was alloted 41 seats instead of the
existing 43 Lok Sabha seats. As a result, the strength of the State
Assembly, which will be an integral multiple of Lok Sabha seats, was
13
also reduced from 311 to 287.
Another significant pre-election measure of the government which
certainly has had an impact on the behavior of the contesting candidates
and their electioneering was the 19th Amendment to the Constitution
abolishing the existing Election Tribunals. Under the Representation of
the People (Amendment) Act of 1966, passed by the Lok Sabha, power was
invested in the High Courts to hear the election petitions.
Meanwhile, the population of Andhra Pradesh has increased by 15.7
percent in 1961 over the 1951 population. The second and third general
elections in the State and in the country were conducted on the basis of
1951 census, whereas the fourth general elections were held on the basis
of 1961 census.
The electorate of Andhra Pradesh has increased by ten percent for
1967 elections over the 1962 elections. That is, the electorate has been
increasing much faster than the population increase rate. If this rate
continues, the "old guards" of the Congress party or of any other party
soon will be on their way out of the elections and so from the political
scene, as it has already been indicated in the fourth general elections.
The number of polling stations in Andhra Pradesh was increased from 21,500
in 1962 to 23,800 in the 1967 elections because of the increased electorate,
as indicated below:
14
The Growth of PMPul&ticn and Electorate in A.P,
Population Electcrate
i
L-iS
—
r
i r
Ifll 1561 62 1967
3*113,000 35,977,959 ,007,856 21,081,30
Am seen from the above figures, there was an in reaee of 15,7 percent
in population over a peri<-.a* of ten years, marking a 1.57 percent average
increase in population every year. On the other hand, there was a ten
percent increase of electorate over the 1962 elections or over a year period
of five years, marking a tvo percent average increase in the electorate
every year.
Chapter III
PARTIES IN ACTION
The reality is that at any given moment we have a
party whose most important characteristic is not that it
is Socialist, Liberal, or Conservative, but that is pro-
viding the Government. It will not be dislodged until a
combination of its own incompetence and arrogance drives
together sufficient disparate groups of discontent to
replace it.
—a Member of British Parliament
Sigmund Neuman has rightly described the role of political parties
in one sentence as "the life line of modern politics," But often
confusing in developing countries is what makes and runs those political
parties. Is it the ideology, any principles, issues, personalities or
personal antogonisms, caste or religion or elections or what else?
Contrary to the similarities of Andhra Pradesh with the general
picture in India, it represented a quite different picture of party posi-
tions on the eve of the fourth general elections. The deep differences
before the 1967 elections within the Andhra Congress, though as old as
1950, shocked many, and of course were welcomed by others. "In Andhra
it was not known clear (sic) who was more sharply divided—Congress or
Communists," It was, thus, a picture of "balancing of weaknesses" of
political partiesin the State. The Communists, unlike the Congress,
divided into two parties and opposed each other whereas the Congress was
without a split into clear cut parties. Swatantra, as a party failed to
inspire and exploit the situation, the best opportunity it ever got. The
other multi-State parties were only splinter groups in Andhra Pradesh.
16
Differences, both personal and ideological, if any, within and among
political parties in general and Congress party in particular, which
had been kept in leash during the years of the Nehru era have had to come
more sharply into the open during the election period. And it was felt
that the political parties were passing through a regrouping and realign-
17
ment of policies. Perhaps it might have been a natural process in a
pluralistic society where all are not pluralistic parties.
Where one party is dominant in a political system, it is but natural
18
that all politics relate to or comes out of its functioning. By a
look at the working of the Congress party—the "Giant Killer" among the
political parties one can understand the politics of a State.
The Congress Party :
"If the Congress was out of power for some time then,
all the filth and dirt would go over to the party that
would come into power . ..." 19
Despite bitter disputes, factionalism, and development of a "dissident"
group within the Congress party, as if a strong opposition party evolved
in a struggle for power, none of those dissidents or those debarred
from the Congress party onthe election eve, could form a separate party
as happened in other States in India.
The Andhra Congress never existed united and it was always faction
ridden, but then interestingly, it never became weak to the extent necessary
to be vulnerable to the opposition except during the period of 1952-55. But,
that was because of the defection of two of the party champions in the
State synchronizing with the increasing Communist organization and
linguistic movement for a separate Andhra State. In fact, the first
17
Congress Government of the separate Andhra State collapsed because of
factionalism within, and Communist harassment on a no-confidence motion. 20
Probably, the Congress party was nowhere else so weak and the Communist
party nowhere else so strong and well organized as in Andhra (and in Kerala)
during that period.
In fact, personal politics, caste politics, and factional politics
existed in Andhra even before the formation of Andhra State. They were
only more intensified than every before in the initial years. The point
here is, that with a change in the order of these factors and their
intensities, the Andhra Congress was always divided whenever an election
or selection for a party or govenment post took place. If it was at the
district level or within a district, the Congress party in the district
was divided into two or three groups, with one of them acting as an
opposition party to the "office-holding 11 group. In that process, new align-
ments took place and loyalties shifted to the leaders and groups at the
State capital. The sharpness of the factions varied only in degree from
time to time with personalities changing their places as "tables turn."
In spite of these increased bitter rivalries (more than in any other
21
State), the Congress party in Andhra Pradesh came out of the fourth
general elections with an absolute majority as it did only in Maharastra and
Madhya Pradesh States. The success story of Andhra Congress in the 1967
elections like that of the Communists in 1951, is a striking case in point.
The Andhra Pradesh Congress until now has given a typical impression that
the more the party divided internally, with no considerable defections,
22
the stronger it would be or at least it would be as strong as ever before.
18
The Svafrmtra JParty.
The Swatantra party in Andhra Pradesh and Processor N, G. Xanga,
the one tfjsw osost popular leader of Andhra, go together. But pre feasor
Range has never regained hie popularity after his leaving the CongreM
party nor the Swatantra party has ever reached the raas ''ring ita
eight years of existence.
The Swatantra party in Andhra Pradesh, as in few other States, had
al" v?b its fore-runner with brief intervals since the first general
elections in 1951. Range is an unsuccessful pelitldan of Andhra (
all his right decisions at wrong times). Many eay tlmt he cannot play
political gacaes and gianicfea that were necessary for a taan to be in politics.
He has never appeared to aspire for power. To aspire for power is essential
for a leader to keep hinself as well as Us party up-to-date, these were
the disqualifications of Ranga and also the Swatantra party , em& reasons
for their not gaining, if not regaining the old, deserved popularity in
Andhra Pradesh,
The story e£ t*e r^atantrm party and its fore-runners confirm that
parties
baaed around a few individuals or depending upon their personalities
cannot leep up with the chat ^.'ag politics el India, particularly in the
rural scene* Moreover, a party which does not really aio for power but
looks for its \ -estige* cannot hope to appeal to the eass in the present
day politics of India, this was MM of the theata* the Swatantra party
Secretary M. a. Meaani took u^ C lections at all Indlal level,
With his wooing speeches and election strategy, he filled lie f s. ' lowers
19
of the party with confidence that the Swatantra party can form a strong
opposition to the Congress, and was able to do so after February, 1967.
Though the Swatantra party formally came into existence in 1959, it
could not attract a single leading member of the Congress or of any other
party in the State. Between the third general elections and the fourth
elections at least four to five short lived parties sprang up, but none
of those parties ended by joining the Swatantra or without joining the
Congress party. These parties, started by disgruntled Congressmen, would
have joined the Swatantra party is that party would have exhibited any
dynamism in leadership and confidence.
Masani's report on party affairs since the 1962 general elections
though it did not point out the names of any State, confessed the
"...failure in general to renew membership of existing workers and to
enroll new workers."23 The Report presented to the All-India Swatantra
party Convention held in New Delhi just before the 1967 general election
expressed concern over the ". . .grave implications for the efficient function*
ing of State, district and local units.
Communists :
Several writers, in and outside India, made studies on the Communist
party of India. Every one of them confirmed the deep rooted strength of
communism in Andhra Pradesh. Host of the studies were particularly aimed
at the Communis t party election success in Andhra in 1952. Andhra Pradesh-
including the Andhra and Telengana areas—has always been the strong-hold
of Communists in India. In fact, it was one of "their States" for some
time. At one time the Communists were expected to rule the then newly
formed Andhra State.
20
The conflict between the two rival Communist parties, that divided
on Pro-Peking and pro-Moscow lines, was more marked in Andhra Pradesh
and West Bengal States than any where else in India. It was in these
two States, and, of course, in Kerala, that the undivided Communist Party
of India enjoyed considerable base and organizational hold. 2 ->
But in Andhra Pradesh the division between the two factions was
the sharpest and permeated to all levels. The 53 member strong party in
the Assembly was split between 32 rightists (pro-Moscow) and 21 leftists
(pro-Peking) or Marxists as they were otherwise referred. The bitter
inner-party struggle among the Communists in India first reached its high
pitch when the CPI had its sixth Congress in Andhra in April, 1961 at
Vijayawada. The Congress, organized just before the electioneering for
the third general elections, was well attended by all personalities in
the party at the all India level and also by Suslov of the Soviet Communist
Party who was specially deputed for that Congress for cooling down the
"ideological—political and organizational battle" in Communist Party of
India. 26
However, in spite of its inner-party differences, the CPI took part
in the third general elections of 1962 as one unit and one party. But
yet they could not win as many seats as expected. In the fourth general
elections they "...even visualized the prospect of getting a hundred seats
and of unseating of the Congress party with the help of the other parties
and independents ....
The Communist Chinese aggression and its continued threat on India's
borders after 1962 and the subsequent attitude of China had lowered the
prestige of the Communist party in India. In fact, " any person or
21
group who supported, or even appeared to support, the position of China
would have been branded a traitor..." by the people. As against this
general feeling, the Communists, particularly the leftists, did not dare
to criticize the Chinese on the Indo-Chinese conflict.
With important Andhra Communists taking the lead in the National
Council of CPI at New Delhi in April, 1964, 65 members of the party walked
out of the meeting in protest against the pro-Moscow party Chairman S.
A. Dange, and ultimately they all formed a new "Left" party at Tenali in
Andhra Pradesh. The Tenali Convention was the first official organizational
meeting of the "left" operating as a separate party. Since then Andhra
Pradesh has been the scene for both the Communist parties to accuse
each other and muster their own followers within the CPI. In Andhra
Pradesh the Left Communists were better organized and prepared for the
elections than the Right Communists. The strongholds of CPI in Andhra
Pradesh—Nalgonda, Guntur, Krishna and Khammam district—consist of more
active supporters of Leftists. This fact gave them the advantage in the
matters of collection of election funds and mobilization of volunteers
for the fourth general elections.
However, between November and December, 1966 both the Communist parties
met at least five times to patch up their differences and to have a common
manifesto and for an agreement to cease "open polemics" at least until the
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February, 1967 elections. But their differences widened one meeting after
the other, and finally they failed to reach any understanding on the eve
of the elections.
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The Left! party Secretary M. Hanumanta Rao said of Rightists that the
"Rivisionalists were so much over estimating their strength and capacity
Of)
that they are asking for the moon.... On the other side, the Right
party Secretary N. Rajasekhara Reddy, a brother of Congress party Sanjeeva
Reddy, said that "...leftists desire that the Right Communists should
be wiped out.... Their aim is to fight first the rivisionists and then the
it
Congress.' How many from each party should contest from stronghold
districts was the main cause of their disagreement and for their inability
to unite and fight the Congress Party. In the party stronghold, the
known leadership was with the Rightists while the cadres were with the
Leftists. The near-parity in their strength was responsible for the bitter
feud over the terms of a working agrangement for the elections.
The situation in Andhra Pradesh was basically different from that
of Kerala or Madras. In Kerala the Leftists dominated the political
life of the State completely, while in Madras, both the Left and Right
parties were equally weak to the extent to make their unity felt on the
elections. But in Andhra Pradesh their unity would have had made some
difference, if not any significant impact on the election results.
To the Left Communists the main objective of the fourth general
elections was to defeat the Congress. But the Rightists, on the other
hand, wanted that the Congress should not be replaced by "more reactionary"
parties. This was one of the prime reasons for the Right party objecting
to the Muslim League inclusion in the Kerala United Front, and the Leftists
associating themselves with DMK in Madras and Swatantra candidates in
Guntur district.
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Other Parties :
Ever since the 1950s the Congress, Communist and Swatantra or its
fore-runner have been the parties that dominated the politics of Andhra
Pradesh. The other political parties were only minor parties with no
significant impact on the politics of the State or on its electorate.
The Jan Sangh and the Republican parties in the State until 1967 were only
symbolic of their existence on the all India political scene. The PSP
and the SSP after 1959 were only parties in exile from State politics.
In fact after the formation of the integrated Andhra Pradesh the
Socialists who had considerable say in undivided Hyderabad State, lost
control of the party followers as well as the electorate.
Dr. Lohia's SSP which at one time was an up-coming party in Andhra
Pradesh—until P.V.G. Raju and his followers joined the Congress in 1959—
had not become popular nor had its organization or its men ever reached the
villages and the districts. The PSP on the other hand never made any
head-way nor has it ever had any organization of its own in Andhra Pradesh.
The better known of the minor parties even without any organization
or strength in the district was the Praja Party, founded by Andhra Lion T.
Prakasam, the first Chief Minister of Andhra State. Despite Praja Party
chairman Tenneti Viswanatham's popularity and prestige in Andhra, the
party remained only a one man show. A little known party in the State
politics was the Republic Party. This party had no organization nor
any activity except a State Council consisting of few individuals. The
Ithehadul Majlis Muslim Party, mostly concentrating in the twin cities,
was a little better known party in Telengana areas. But the party was
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known not because of its organization or activities but because of its
terrorist activities before the Hyderabad Police Action under Kasim
Raavi leadership.
Much earlier before the electioneering started in any other S?:ate,
the Opposition leaders in Andhra Pradesh started the 'talks', 'meetings',
'conferences', and 'dicussions ' on the need of the opposition parties
32forging a united front against the Congress. But interestingly enough,
Andhra Pradesh was one cf the two or three States where not even two
parties could forge any such electoral alliance on the eve of the fourth
general elections.
Chapter IV
CANDIDATES
For some months before the electioneering started, the energies
of the political parties were centered on the choice of candidates for
both Lok Sabha and State Assembly. No one will deny the fact that pro-
per selection of candidates Is the first and most Important step toward
winning an election. Selection of candidates will not only effect the
performance of the party during the battle for the ballot, but the quality
of its work in the legislature also will be effected. If a party comes
to power, the cabinet and its efficiency will ultimately depend upon the
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candidates it selects.
The problem of selection of party candidates has mainly three as-
pects as pointed out by Sirsikar. From who to select is the first
question. The second aspect concerns the qualifications and personalities
of the aspiring candidates. Thirdly, the selecting authority and its
procedure for selection may became decisive elements.
Of the ten, small and large, recognized and unrecognized parties
that took part in the election, only Congress, Communists and Swatantra
had any procedure for the selection of their candidates. Of these
parties Congress had an elaborate and complex procedure because of the
keen competition between the aspirants in addition to the bitter factions
within the party for party tickets. There were five to six applicants to
the Pradesh Election Committee (P.E.C.) from Congress members to contest
from each Assembly constituency.
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The Congress Central Election Committee (C.E.C.), the top and final
selection body of all Congress candidates in the country, had a tough
time for three months after October in finalizing the Andhra Pradesh list
of candidates. If the factions in State units were deep or if the Congress
Party was expected to return to power after the elections, the rush for
tickets was larger, and it took a longer time and became a special task
for the C.E.C.
Andhra Pradesh was one of the three tough states where the Congress
was in utter chaos that gave the C.E.C. a difficult time and made arriving
at any decision very difficult. In regard to Andhra Pradesh, the C.E.C.
had to appoint a high-power sub-committee to resolve the Andhra selections.
The process of the selection of Congress candidates may be divided
into three stages: District Congress Committee (D.C.C.), Pradesh Congress
Election Committee (P.E.C.), and the C.E.C. Of these three stages, the
P.E.C. is the key to the other two stages. The candidates of those in
the majority or in control of the P.E.C. are usually approved by the C.E.C.
The P.E.C, which is elected by the Pradesh Congress members, had
eleven members in Andhra Pradesh. Of these eleven members one, a Minister
Alapati Venkatramayya, died long before the election talk. Among the
remaining ten members, both the groups in the State had an equal number
of five on each side. Crucial importance was attached to the election of
that vacant eleventh seat.
Both the groups selected their candidates from Circar districts,
and the official group candidate was the Steelman Kakani Venkataratnam
of Krishna district, a veteran Congressman. With the success of Steel-
man Kakani, the ministerial group "scored a first round victory over
27
the dissidents."**6 But the dissidents were not sufficiently disappointed
over this defeat to discontinue their dissident activities. They viewed
that the majority of one by the ministerialists was not an enduring one,
and, second, and most importantly, they had their leader Sanjeeva Reddy
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at the center. He would also sit in the C.E.C. as its important member.
Long before February, 1967, on September 21, 1966, the P.C.C. invited
applications from its members interested in contesting in the general
elections. As per the schedule of the P.C.C, directions x*ere given to
the D.C.C.'s to meet and send their recommendations before October 25 to
the P.C.C.
After the P.E.C. eleventh member election was over on September 29,
both the groups were equally busy filing their applications but not with-
out any object of defeating the other group's candidate if selected,
ignoring their own applications.
Observers were sent to each district by the EC.C. to be present at
the D.C.C. meetings at the time of making their recommendations and to
hear any representation from the party workers and the public in contro-
versial constituencies. The aspiring candidates from those constituencies
had to display their support in their respective constituencies. In order
to display their support, both the groups began to muster and mobilize
the support of Village Panchyats, Panchyat Samiths, Cooperative Societies
as well as support from the party workers in the constituencies. Producing
all of them before the P.C.C. observer when he was visiting those con-
stituencies to see their display of respective support and strength was
like that of two enemies gathering on a battle field.
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The D.C.C.'s sent their recommendations to the P.E.C. But at the
State level the P.E.C. can alter, delete or include any names it wishes.
With the district recommendations reaching the P.E.C. the venue of pre-
election inner-party tussle between the two groups was shifted back to
Hyderabad. The two groups were active in planning their future strategies
to get as many tickets as possible to their respective group followers.
The reason for this planning was that' the P.E.C. was almost evenly divided
between the ministerialists (6) and dissidents (5). The dissidents had
had their leaders at New Delhi to look after them.
By the first week in November the P.E.C. finalized the State list
to be sent to the C.E.C. with a one member majority in the P.E.C. But
the dissident five members of the P.E.C. who did not participate in the
P.E.C. deliberations also prepared another "full-fledged alternative
list" for the first time in the country to send to the C.E.C. along with
the majority official P.E.C. list.
The offical list of the P.E.C. included all the dissident ministers
except the Health Minister, Challapalli Raja, and the Women's Welfare
Minister, Mrs. Sadalakhmi. 38
Out of the 215 Congress members of the Assembly, including those who
joined the Congress after the 1962 elections, 196 had applied for party
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tickets. Of those 196, 127 were recommended by the six member official
group of the P.E.C. Their lists also included 34 candidates who were
defeated in the 1962 elections, 24 persons who were elected in 1962,
opposing and defeating a Congress candidate, and four candidates out of
the remaining 11 who had applied from among those who were denied tickets
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in the third general elections but contested as independents. The P.E.G.
recommended only thirteen of the sitting M.P.'s who had applied for Lok
Sabha seats. Of these thirteen, six were women and two Muslims. For
Assembly seats, of the sitting six Muslim M.L.A.'s who had applied, four
were recommended; out of fcrty-five scheduled caste and eleven scheduled
tribes* M.L.A.'s, only eighteen and two, respectively, were included in
the P.E.C. list. The P.E.C. tried to keep at least 50 to 70 percent of
those sitting, and the rest were recommended after a "hunt up for some
veteran Congressman forgotten for years."* Among the new candidates
recommended by both the groups for Lok Sabha was Dr. Hussain Zaheer, a
former Director of the Indian Council of Scientific Research. Only with
regard to five Lok Sabha seats and 30 Assembly seats out of 41 and 287,
respectively, both the lists sent to the C.E.C. contained common names.
"The position in Andhra Pradesh," writes The Times of India , "is much
worse than U.P. and Bihar where the rival factions have agreed in respect
iiAl
to a majority of seats.
With the dispatch of the P.E.C. list to the C.E.C, political activity
shifted to New Delhi followed by a series of pilgrimages to Delhi by
congressmen of both the groups to press their cases. The political
correspondent of The Hindu reported from New Delhi that there were over
1,000 Andhra Congressmen in Delhi when the C.E.C. took up the Andhra list.
There had been special flights of the I.A.C. (Indian Airlines Corporation)
from Hyderabad to Delhi bringing prospective Congress candidates and their
supporters. z
When the two lists of Congress candidates from Andhra reached Jantar
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Mantar Road, where the A.I.C.C. office at New Delhi is located, concern
was expressed at the increased open rivalry within the party after the
eleventh member P.E.C. election, The central leaders were concerned for
the future of the Party in the State. Comi remise efforts to patch up the
differences and to review both the lists of candidates were made by Congress
President Kamaraj and other leaders, and various techniques were used for
ironing out the differences, but all were in vain. The Congress President
meanwhile "advised" the Chief Minister Kasu to review the list of the
P.E.C. He also advised him not to consider the application of rebel
congressmen and stated that those ''sitting members who desired to contest
the elections against whom there were no complaints' 1 be given tickets.
Hhen the C.E.C. met on December 2, 1966, to consider the Andhra Congress
candidates, it could not even discuss the matter because of the complica-
tions involved. However, the C.E.C. again asked both the groups in the
Andhra Congress to make an attempt to submit a list of candidates upon
which they agreed for both Parliament and State Assembly. The C.E.C.
also "suggested" that one person from each group sit together along with
a third person agreed upon by both the groups to iron out the differences
and to "submit an agreed list to the extent possible'' without disturbing
the sitting M.P. 's and M.L.A. 's. But to this proposal, Kasu preferred
to talk with Sanjeevayya, representative of the dissidents, directly
instead of before a third outsider from another S:ate. However, their
several hours of meeting "to agree to certain basic principles which
AC
should govern the selection cf candidates" failed. J Following the fai-
lure of all other attempts, the C.E.C. had to take an "unusual step 1 ' by
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setting up a "high-power sub-conmitt.ee' 1 consisting of Morarjai, S.K. Patil,
and Y,B. Chavan to resolve the deadlock over the selection of Congress
candidates in Andhra Pradesh.
It should be mentioned at this point that Sanjeeva Reddy did not de-
cide about his future--whether to contest for an Assembly seat or for a
Lok Sabha seat—until the appointment of the high-power committee. He
was waiting only for a chance to go back to State politics which had slipped
out of his control since his leaving the State affairs to Kasu. Some of
his followers, who were dissidents in State politics, were already pressing
him to contest for an Assembly seat and to take up the State leadership
again. But, if Sanjeeva Reddy entered the State polticis, Chief Minister
Kasu's position would naturally be endangered, and there might be a contest
between them for State leadership which might cause further deterioration
of the conditions in the Andhra Congress. As such, the Congress President
wanted to avoid a straight contest for leadership, and he did not "like
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any one of them to be completely eliminated from the political scene."
"An informal understanding," writes Rangaswany of Efae Hindu , : as to
who should fill which place after the elections, can help to sort out
47differences and a united front can still emerge in Andhra.
The three-man sub-committee could not take up the list, particularly
that list of Assembly candidates because in its first sitting it was not
decided whether Sanjeeva Reddy would be opting for Lok Sabha or State
Assembly. But with Sanjeeva Reddy 'deciding' by the first week of December
to contest for Lok Sabha, presumably at the initiation of Kamaraj, it was
possible for the sub-cemmittee to quickly finalize the Andhra list, With
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Sanjeeva Reddy deciding to opt for a Lok Sabha seat, a threat to Chief
Minister Kasu's leadership in the State was averted. With that the
Ministerials, who were sure that no one other than Sanjeeva Reddy could
pose a threat in State politics to their group, were willing to adjust
the seats with the rival dissident's lists.
Thus, a great deal of controversy centers around personalities and
not on any issues. The question was to find political positions for the
leaders involved in the controversy, whether it be at State level or dist-
rict level.
When the C.E.C. met on December 17, most, of the candidates, bot for
Lok Sabha and Assembly, were decided in two sittings, including that of
Sanjeeva Reddy as a candidate for Hindupur Lok Sagha constituency. In
selecting thirty-five of the forty-one Lok Sabha candidates, both the groups
were given equal weightage.^8 The C.E.C. picked seventeen of the candidates
from the recommended list of the P.E.C. and twelve from the list of the
rival five member P.E.C; the rest of the six were nominated by the C.E.C.
from among those aspirants whose names were not there in both the lists.
Of the 269 candidates selected by the C.E.C. at the recommendation of
the three man sub-committee, 169 belonged to the ministerialists, and the
other 100 belonged to the dissident list. Thus, to avoid any showdown of
any group, the sub-committee, upon whose recommendation the C.E.C. had
finally selected and announced the candidates, had picked the candidates
from both the lists of ministerialists and dissidents, keeping in mind the
fact that one was backed by six and the other by five. The rest of the
pending candidates for six Lok Sabha seats and eighteen Assembly seats
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were later slelected as per the agreement reached at New Delhi, seme by
Chief Minister Kasu, a fev by Sanjeeva JUddy, and the rest by Congress
P esident Kamaraj in consultation with the State Congress Chief.
Even with the completion of the selection process of Congress Candidates,
the groupism had not ended nor had any cordial atmosphere been created in
State politics. On the other hand, the breach had been further widened
not only because of disgruntled elements in both the groups upon refusing
tickets and sabotaging of the rivals by sponsoring powerful independents
but also because of the group leader's, open support to those n bel elements
in the districts.
Chief Minister Kasu said o£ the final list of candidates that though
he was !1not unhappy," 'here and there, better people could have been put,
4°
keeping their sueceaB in view.
Whereas, the dissident leader A.C. Subba Reddy came out openly declaring
that "his group had decided that he should be a candidate for the Chief
Ministership." A.C. Subba Seddy further stated before a press conference
that the ''dissident group would have a majority in the Congress Legislature
Party after the elections.
. .in the Legislative Council, the o/ficial group
had now a majority of ten as the position stood today. But after the elec-
tions of the Asset ply, there will be a definite swing to cur side.'' 51
A.C, as he is known among his close associates, summed up the attitude
of the dissident group thus: "As far as we are concerned, we are anxious
to see that the Congress wins a majority cf seats in the Assembly. We
will do our best to see that all the candidates of our group will come out
successfully. Me will also spare no pains to do what little we can for the
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success of the Congressmen of the other group."52 When Press reporters
asked A.C. how he could claim "his group's majority over the ministerialists,"
he said that "even though the official group had an edge of about 41
candidates over the dissidents, the latter would actually win a greater
number of seats than the official group. In the Telengana area nearly 65
candidates were from the official group out of 101. But, the dissidents
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would win 25 out of the 36 seats given to them." The Hindu further
reported that A.C. "was confident that the official group would not win
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more seats than the dissidents in Telengana.
The P.C.C. President, P. Timma Reddy, said that "he was sorry that
some deserving persons could not be given Congress tickets because of dif-
ferences in the Congress."55 One day, before this statement of Timma Reddy,
the Prime Minister and the ministerialists' only hope at the center, Mrs.
Indira Gandhi said that "Congress could have selected some better candidates."
Interestingly enough, the C.E.C. which began its task of selecting
Congress candidates for the country by insisting that a certain proportion
of the candidates chosen should be "new blood," ended with a main concern to
retain as many of the sitting M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s as possible. With the
receipt of the Andhra dissident's list as against the official P.E.C. list,
the problem of immediate importance before the C.E.C. was that of selecting
not the most suitable but the least controversial candidates. This means,
that hurdles, if any, for the continuance of factionalism which had bedevilled
the Congress organization, were to be removed. Because even after the
elections, under the C.E.C. 's new plan, divisions or groups within each
State would continue at least for another five years and which further might
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lead to setting up broad-based ministeries of large contingents consisting
of both the groups. ^' Hardly any member from the professional or technical
group was attracted by any list of Congress candidates. A member of the
Board of Revenue, who retired to apply for a Congress ticket, was not
preferred. Dr. Hussain Zaheer, retired Director of the C.I.S.R. , whose
name was recommended by both the lists, was finally not given a ticket by
the C.E.C. "An important member of the C.E.C* said that it was better that
a scientist remained a scientist.'
The C.E.C. refused to nominate in Bihar those candidates who in the
1962 elections left the Congress to fight as independents and who subsequent-
ly rejoined the Congress. But in Andhra Pradesh almost all the 31 member
bloc of the United Democratic Party who joined the Congress in 1965 were
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given tickets.
As most of the names of candidates were announced by the C.E.C, those
belonging to both the groups who were not given tickets and so were dis-
gruntled began to work out their own plans for contesting as independents.
Soon they were back in the villages from New Delhi and Hyderabad to consult
their followers if they had any. As the nominations' date, January 13,
approached, 50 rebelled against the Congress and filed their nominations
as independents. The P.C.C. President warned all those "rebel Congressmen"
who filed their nominations against Congress's offical candidates to with-
draw from the contest. But only a few headed after negotiations: but the
rest knew that they could go beck to Congress or Congress would take them
back if they once won or even otherwise if the balance of power positions
in the party changed from one group to the other. And that day might come
36
60
at any time for those rebel Congressmen.
Finally 48 rebel Congressmen who did not withdraw from the contest
were debarred from the party for six years. It is interesting to note that
both the groups encouraged those disgruntled men to contest against the
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strong men of the other group.
Thus, the number of independent candidates who contested in the 1967
election had gone up to 402 for the Assembly and up to 61 for Lok Sabha.
In fact, some of these independents were also financed by the other candidate,
usually a Congress candidate himself, contesting in the same constituencey
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to serve as a dividing factor among the voters.
Swatantra
The Swatantra Party has not had any long process of selection of its
candidates nor has it had any good number of aspiring people to contest
on its ticket. By December 10, the Swatantra Party announced its first list
of constituencies where it was planning to contest and some of the candidates
for those constituencies. Though they wanted to contest for about 136
Assembly seats and 20 Lok Sabha seats, by the time of the last date for
nominations, it could find candidates for only 89 and 19 constituencies,
respectively. But it was very liberal in allotting its symbol to those who
contested even after being refused a ticket by Congress.
The elder statesman and founder- leader of the Swatantra Party, Rajaji,
long before the electioneering appealed to the interested voters through
newspaper advertisements to come forward and contest as Swatantra Party
candidates, something which no other party had attempted before.
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A look at the Swatantra Party list in Andhra Pradesh indicates that
no candidate volunteered to contest on the basis of C.R.'s (Rajaji) appeal.
However, the party was able, as elsewhere in the country, to put up some
new candidates particularly from professionals. In Andhra Pradesh, except
for twelve candidates, the rest were old members of the power politics.
There were at least sixteen candidates who contested with the Swatantra
Party star symbol for various reasons of their own. Some of them applied
for a Swatantra ticket when Congress refused, and others with personal
grudges against the Congress candidate. 3
The Parliamentary Board of the State Swatantra Party, after the Congress
Party' 8 full list was announced on December 16, reviewed its earlier
December 9 list, and "decided not to set up Party candidates in constituencies
where it felt it had not sufficient strength to win the elections."
Except for Professor Ranga and Latchanna, other local influential
leaders like Bezawada Ramachandra Reddy, and sitting members of Assembly
C. D, Naidu, Desh Pande, and Rajagopala Naidu did not contest though some
of them were given party tickets. C. D. Naidu contested for a Lok Sabha
seat in a far away Warangal district.
Of the fifteen sitting members of the party only seven contested again
in the 1967 elections, and the rest had not applied for a party ticket or
secured a Congress Party ticket."5 The Party could not nominate any. to
candidate in two constituencies in the Cuddaph district where it won in the
1962 elections. *>*> The Party also decided unanimously to withdraw its
candidate, G. B. Appa Rao from Visakhapatnam Lok Sabha constituency in favor
of Praja Party Tenneti. But Appa Rao did not withdraw his candidacy from the
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contest. 67 Another feature of the Swatautra Party was that in spite of its
relatively better local hold in Guntur Lok Sabha constituency area, it had
not nominated any candidate against Congress' Candidate, K. Raghuramaiah „ a
man introduced to politics by Ranga himself, in spite of an applicant for
that constituency. Govinda Rao, pplied for a Swatantra Party ticket
to contest from Guntur Lok Sabha constituency was not given party nomination
as such he contested as an independent. In the 1962 election also the
Swatantra Party did not put up any of its candidates against Congress'
EU ghurauaiah.
The paucity of candidates and the dependence of the party on a few
individuals could further be seen by the fact that two of its leaders
contested both for Assembly and Lok Sabha seats. G. Latchanna, the State
Party Chairman, contested both for Srikakulara Lok Sabha and for an Assembly
seat and won both while G. B. Appa Rao contested both for Visakhapatnam Lok
Sabha and for an Assembly seat in the same Visakhapatnam district and won
the Assem. ly seat.
VJhenever the candidates' selection body, the State Parliamentary Board,
met, its meeting usually ended with a unanimous authorization to the State
Party President Latchanna 'to examine and recommend suitable candidate;. °
Slightly over one- third of the final 89 candidates who contested on
the Swatantra symbol for the Assembly x?ere Lawyers; slightly less than one-
third were farmers: and the rest were from other professions. But all of
them were either from the middle class or free) above middle class families;
and most of them were younger than an average Congress candidate.
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CoKammist Candidates
The sharp division in the rank and file of the Communist Party of
India down from the village level created a problem, both for Left and
Right Parties equally, In the matters of selecting their candidates to
contest in the fourth general elections. Where the Right Party had a
sitting member, the party cadre was in the hands of Leftists. At the time
of the unsuccessful talks between the two Communists Parties, the Rightists
insisted that all their thirty- two sitting members be given party tickets
from their respective constituencies. Whereas, the Leftists were of the
opinion that all of the Thirty-two Right members had been elected in the
1962 elections only because of Left members' support and strength, and,
as such, they could not allow all those members to contest again from those
constituencies as compromise Communist candidates. This opinion was the
basis of the two parties failure to come to any electoral understanding
particularly in the selection of compromise candidateo x^ho were popular in
the Cc. raunists strongholds.
Of the thirty- two sitting members, the Rightists could find constituencies
only for twenty- three. Of the 102 candidates the Rightists had put up,
79 were fresh; of them twenty had been defeated in the 1962 elections, and
the remaining 59 were contesting for the first time. But the Leftists
contested for only S3 Assembly constituencies. For Lok Sabha the Rightists
had put up their candidat. a for twenty constituencies to exhibit their
supremacy over the Leftists who nominated their candidates only for eleven
seats out of the total 41.
Both the Right and Left Parties could not put up any candidates from
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any profession or from among the women. However, each Party had one woman
candidate in two different constituencies in the Krishna district. One of
the candidates belonging to the Left, Manikonda Suryavati, was an active
Party worker end a member of the Legislative Council who had just then
completed her term. The other Right Party lady candidate was completely
new to politics. Both of the Parties together were able to put up three
Muslim candidates—two by the Rightists and one by the Leftists. In the
Kadiri Assembly constituency Muslim candidates of both the Parties were
pitted against a Reddi Congress candidate (and were defeated with a wide
margin)
.
Interestingly enough, the Communists for the 1967 elections could not
nominate their candidates for any of the scheduled caste and tribe reserved
constituencies for which they had contested in every earlier election.
This fact indicates that the Communists were losing ground and were, losing
their hold over and among the backward section of the people. On the other
side, in the twin cities where the employed and labor are concentrated, the
Communists were able to put up their candidate only for one constituency
out of eleven seats.
But despite the Communists' hold and organization in Guntur city and
outside, they did not put up any candidate as they had done in the 1962
elections against Congress Raghuramaiah. 9
Most of the Communist candidates in the 1967 elections, as in the
earlier elections, were drawn from among their party cadre who were not
experienced in any political office. The majority of them were farmers,
and a few were agricultural laborers. They were all from rural areas, and
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very few candidates were from among petty businesses or other non-pro-
fessions, and these candidates who live in the cities contested those city
constituencicc
.
Leftist Party leaders Sundarayya and Ravi Narayana Reddy did not con-
test in the 1967 elections unlike the previous elections. The leaders
of both the parties in Rayalasuma contested one against the other with an
Jimmediate object of defeating the other. Of the twenty-two sitting Left
members, sixteen were put up as candidates again for the 1967 elections.
These sitting members were put in jail early in 1966 under D.I.R. (Defense
of India Rule). Important of these who were jailed and against whom the
Rightists also put up their candidates with an object of defeating them
vore N. Prasada Rao, K. L. Narasimha Rao, Koratala, Bapa Inaih, and T. Nagi
Reddy.
Compared to the Congress, Communists and Swatantra, the other minor
parties in the State had no procedure at all in selecting their candidates.
These parties had a paucity of candidates to contest on their symbols.
A most interesting point of Jan Sangh candidates in the 1967 elections
was that there were two Muslims contesting on its banner from Adilabad and
Karimnagar districts. Within the twin cities, not far from Nirraal and
Karimnagar Assembly constituencies where the Muslims contested as Jan Sangh
candidates, the contest between the Jan Sangh Hindu candidates and the
Majlis Muslim candidates was open and bitter. In fact the growth of Jan
Sangh in Telengana in recent years was a counterattack against the expanding
Muslim Majlis activities.
The majority of the 79 Assembly and seven Lok Sabha candidates of Jan
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Sangh were either from petty trading Varsya or from Brahmin communities.
Jan Sangh of late had been able to attract the dismayed, and educated
middle class in towns and cities. Almost all of its candidates were from
this section of people.
Those who contested in other than the Nellore, the twin cities, the
Vijayanagaram constituencies, were not active members of the Party. The Jan
Sangh, as elsewhere in the country, had nominated its candidates in a
majority of the urban Assembly constituencies.
It was the Parliamentary Board of State Jan Sangh, the selection body
in the State, that announced its list on November 28, 1966, before any other
party did so. The president of the party, Jupudi Yagnanarayana, went around
the districts and announced that his party would contest for 120 Assembly
seats, but on the last date of withdrawal there remained only 79 candidates
on the run as against 67 in the 1962 elections. While on his trips to the
districts, the party president "selected" his party candidates after consulting
the few party workers it had in the districts. The former president of all
India Jan Sangh, Avasarala Rama Rao, who was defeated in the 1962 elections,
did not contest againsin 1967.
The party had two women candidates for Assembly. The Parliamentary
Board of Jan Sangh, like that of Swatantra, liberally obliged all those who
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applied at the last minute for its symbol.
The P.S.P. and the S.S.P each with nine candidates for the Assembly and
one of the three candidates for Lok Sabha, respectively, could not nominate a
single new member. The only sitting member of S.S.P. , T.K.R. Sarma contested
from the same constituency where he had won in 1962.
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Two of the P.S.P. and S. S. P. trade union leaders in the twin cities,
B.S. Mahadev Singh and S.B. GIri, contested from Secundrabad Assembly and
Lok Sabha constituencies. In no other city could these parties put up
their candidates. The rest of the candidates scattered here and there in
the districts; none of them was popular nor did any have any backing in
the villages. Those candidates were only old Socialists who had not yet
fully deserted the defunct party in the State, particularly in the districts.
In 1967, the S.S.P. was able to drag out a city millionaire, Badri Visal
Pitti, to contest as its candidate for a constituency where the business
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communi ty was dominant
.
The Republican Party with no sitting member in the State Assembly and
no organization, fielded eleven candidates for Assembly and two for Lok
Sabha. In fact, the party and its leaders were little known in the
State. All the candidates of the Republican Party were from the backward
class, and, of the eleven, six candidates were from the East and West
Godavari districts and the rest scattered. The Party Secretary, J. Eswari
Bai, as in earlier elections, contested against her old rival, the Women's
Welfare Minister, Sadalakshmi, also from the backward class.
The two candidates who contested for lok Sabha were also from the
East Godavari district and were the same candidates who also contested for
Assembly seats. 7°
The Majlis Ittehadul Muslim Party, restricting itself to twin cities,
contested for two Lok Sabha seats and seven Assembly seats rather than the
eight Assembly seats it had contested for in the 1962 elections. Its only
sitting member and Chief of the Party, Salahuddin Owasi, who defeated a
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powerful Congress Muslim Minister in the 1962 elections, was again a
candidate for a muslin majority Chairman or Assembly constituency (to defeat
in 1967 yet another Muslim minister). Its other active member, Khaja
Nizamuddin, who was defeated in 1962 by a Congress Muslim Candidate, Rasheed,
was again a candidate against the same Rasheed but this time defeated him.
The Party could not put up its candidates to all the eleven constituencies
intiie twin cities. All its candidates were Muslims with little knowledge
of State politics.
Tenneti Viswanathara, President and only sitting member of the Praja
Party, contested in 1967 from Visakhapatnara Assembly and Lok Sabha
Constituencies. In 1962 he contested from two Assembly constituencies. He
was the only candidate of his party to contest.
Goparaju Ramachandra Rao, popularly known in India as TtGora", was one
of the important candidates and was spokesman of the three Partyle3s
Democracy candidates who contested in the 1967 elections in Andhra Pradesh.
The Partyless Democracy, a movement started by :!Gora'' himself, should be
watched in the future with care and attention for its impact on Indian
politics.
There were also three Mv slim League candidates, a branch of the Indian
Muslim League, started just before the fourth elections in Andhra Pradesh.
Osman Bin Saleh, the only candidate of the League in Muslim Majority areas
of Hyderabad, was a splitter group member of Salahuddin Owasi controlled
Ithehadul Muslim Majlis Party.
For 60 Assembly seats, except Congress, no other party was able to put
up its own candidates, though some of those parties supported the independents
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who contested against the Congress candidates. Never before were so many
Independents supported by parties nor were there ever so many constituencies
left out by opposition parties in nominating their candidates.
The number of candidates, both independents and of parties who con-
tested in 1967 for different Assembly seats, was:
55 constituencies 2 candidates (direct)
79 constituencies 3 candidates
76 constituencies 4 candidates
47 constituencies 5 candidates
Ifl constituencies 6 candidates
10 constituencies 7 candidates
Dr. K.L. Rao, a Union Minister, was declared elected unopposed in 1967
when no party, including the Cousnunists, put any candidate to oppose him
in Vijayavada Lok Sabha constituency, where the Communists were supposed
to have had enough strength and party organization to oppose him. K.L.
Rao's increased prestige and popularity in the area and the fact that he
was not an active Congress vaginae prevented the Coomunists and Gwatantra
from nominating their candidates.
Similarly, two Congress candidates from tiro Telengana Assembly
constituencies were not opposed by any candidate. In 1962 six Congress
candidates were elected unopposed. 8
The final party and in^ep indent candidates in the contest in i,&7
elections for both Assembly and Lok Sabha seats were as follow*!
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an example, one finds that against a Reddy Congress candidate in Darsi
constituency a Karama Swatantra candidate won. In its neighboring Kandukur
constituency the Swatantra Party nominated a Reddy candidate against a
Kamma Congress candidate. In another neighboring constituency a Reddy
Congress candidate was against a Reddy who was nominated as a Swatantra
candidate. Similarly, in Pamarru Assembly constituency in East Godvari
district against a Congress Kamma rich candidate who was also a former
minister, a Reddy was sponsored as an independent in that majority Kamma
population constituency; but still the independent Reddy won that seat.
But the baste factor cannot always be discounted. For example, the
Congress selects its candidate in some constituencies on the basis of caste
and religion. In Charminar and Asifnagar Assembly constituencies in
Hyderabad, the Congress was particularly bent upon putting in Muslim
candidates only, in spite of 40 percent non-Muslims in those areas. Even
then in only one of these two constituencies was Congress able to win,
while in others it stood third--behind the Jan Sangh candidate who was new
to politics scoring far better than Congress and a Majlis Muslim candidate
winning the seat. Sanjeevayya was defeated because he did not take the
caste factor into account. He preferred non-Reddis in all the Assembly
constituencies that constituted his Lok Sabha constituency where the Reddis
were in the majority. But in Duggirala in Guntur district where Kammas
and Reddis were almost equal in number, the Kamma independent candidate,
Siva Prasad, lost even his deposit, and Congress Reddy candidate won the
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seat over another Reddy independent with a margin of less than 500 votes.
In all, the caste factor was well described when Joseph R. Gusfield said
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neans the ^cle nor the d Lai base of tl
contesting fore ,**•* As he further rightly pointed out ''in many elections
the classic U.S. pattern of 'balancing tickets' occurs.'
CHAPTER V
FACTORS AND FORCES
Indian voters submit to group pressures rather than to
rational calculations of the national interest; but so, indeed,
do far too many British voters, especially those who are
bound to trade union discipline. 83
There are several factors which accounted for the striking success
of the Congress Party despite all the odds against it prevalent in the
pre-election period in the State as elsewhere in other parts of the
country.
In addition to the issues and factors that played a significant part
in the election and its results, there were some striking forces that
were at work long before the electioneering started. To the ministerial
group headed by Chief Minister Kasu, it was a matter of keeping up its
leadership by getting as many of its supporters in the party as possible
to succeed in the general elections. A look at the forces that worked
as undercurrents within the Congress Party will give an understanding of
the factors which played an important role in the general elections in
Andhra Pradesh.
Awareness of the reasons for the "anti-SanJeeva Reddy" growth in the
State, besides the personal dislikes and the reasons that led to those
personal dislikes, may help to gain an understanding of the "electorate"
84behavior and the forces that worked in the elections.
At the outset it should be made clear that as far as Andhra Pradesh
politics are concerned there were no urban-rural politics as such--there
were only rural politics. That is, the role of urban politicians was insig-
nificant at the State level. Even at the district level those leaders in
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the Congress Party, either holding some offices in cities or not, were
or
never dominant. In fact, 82 percent of Andhra's electorate lives in
its 27,900 villages.
As Gusfield pointed out, "Politically, the major cities of India are
less and less the foci of political power. The support of the Congress
Party increasingly comes to rest on rural bases....' So far as Andhra
Pradesh is concerned, even the minor or small towns do not play any signi-
ficant role in the power politics of the Congress Party. The political
situation was rightly assessed by Phillip Altaback, "The real power within
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the Congress Party lies within the regional-based political leaders."
The city politics, except for the twin cities (Hyderabad and
Secunderabad) and to a small extent Visakhapatnam, Guntur, and Vijayawada,
are played by rural-based leaders themselves. Even those politicians of
the twin cities, Vijayawada and Guntur have never had an independent and
dominating say in the State politics or in their district politics.
Under these conditions, it is the men who are in control of Samithi,
Zilla Parishad, Village Panchyat, Village Taluk, and district cooperatives,
and other "offices", "committees", and "Boards", that influence and direct
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the electorate at large.
The man who is able to win the confidence and support of all those
men in the ring in the area will have bright chances in any election. And
these people are the mainstay for anyone to become a leader either at State
level or at district level. That is, those who can influence these men
in the ring in a district will be in a position to turn the electorate at
large towards his leadership, his group, and his Party. The methods and
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messages he selects and uses for this purpose should be such that they
effectively appeal to the men in the ring at the district level.
The Congress in the State has always been "a coalition of State and
on
local factions based on various conflicts. The more "partners" in the
coalition the stronger it is, though the possibility of its breaking down
and forming a new coalition is always present.
The basis for such a coalition may be regional conflict, caste rivalry,
or, as is more often the case in Andhra Pradesh, personal interest and
ambition. As Ram Joshi points out, "the operational style seems to be
identical—to align and realign themselves with the factions in the party
for the control of Party and Government offices."9 But as Paul Brass
brought out, the conflicts at lower levels are based "upon a struggle for
personal prestige" also. 91
The inner-Party fights may be found in (1) the Krishna district between
Steelman Kakani on one side and the Rajas (Challapalll, Nuzvid, Mylavaram
Rajas) on the other side; (2) the Guntur district, between the Kasu family
and the Jagarlamudi family; (3) The Chittoor district between the Tambalapalli
family and others; and (4) the Warangal district between Ramachandra Reddy
and former Jagirdars. These conflicts are primarily for prestige in the
district and then, as Josehi points out, to get control of the "offices".
When sitting M.L.A., for example, is refused a ticket, he will consider
it as damaging to his prestige in that constituency or area.
The Congress candidates are elected not for their policies or philosophies
but for their influence and capabilities in championing local or regional
demands, caste, and for bringing together the men in the ring in a constituency,
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in a district or at State level for a coalition.
The bitter inner-party struggle for power and prestige within the
Congress Party between the ministerialist* and the dissidents and the method
and message in this struggle by the ministerialists have wade their decisive
contributions to the victory of their own group first and then to the
victory of the Congress Party at the 1967 polls.
Until the end of 1965 Sanjeeva Reddy was considered to be the "strong-
man" of Andhra Congress with solid backing behind him in spite of ever pre-
sent antl-Sanjeeva Reddy feeling, though during a brief Interlude (1960-1962)
Sanjeevayya—Satyanarayana Haju managed the State Politics. Wlfc Sanjeeva
Paddy's ''nominee" and long time confidant Kasu, rebelling against his
former "boss", the former became only a leader of the dissidents, struggling
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to keep his prestige and hold over the State Congress.
Before going further one has to understand the situation that prevailed
during the period within the Congress and within the State in general. In
general the Xaasaaa at large were regretting the state of affairs under
Sanjeeva Reddy—his managing the State affairs in the Party and the govern-
ment was often referred to as "Reddi-Raj" by non-Peddis including Brahmins.
Those strongmen of the district party who were overlooked at the Instance
of hand picked men were awaiting an opportunity; and those people—both
Reddis and non-Reddis—in Telengana, who were not given ministerial or other
posts or against whose local political enemy Sanjeeva Reddy waa showing
favor, were looking for a chance for Sanjeeva Reddy to realise their importance.
While in the Circars, the story was a long one going back to the 1950's
Circar districts have always had a decisive role in Andhra politics.
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Without the substantial backing of those areas and their leaders, no one
is sure of getting control of the party and government in the State.
It was with the support of Krishna district leaders that Sanjeeva Reddy
was able to vin over N.G. Range in the crucial and deadly fight of 1951.
Since that time Sanjeeva Reddy had used different tactics to keep his hold
iu the districts. In every district, he undermined or ignored the strong
leaders and hand picked either old and retired or entirely nev members of
the Party as his men in the district. Keeping these men at the helm of
affairs in the districts, he overloaded the government offices and public
posts with "Reddis" or with his pocket-men, always trying to suppress Circar
Kazsmss wherever possible and ignoring the area when it came to the important
allocation of plan projects, saying that the other backward areas should
be developed first.
Soon after the Andhra State was formed, the people of the Vljayawada
and Krishna districts were particularly desirous of getting a bridge over
the Krishna river to connect the Krishna district with the Guntur district.
It is these two districts together with the Godavarl districts that are most
important, politically, agriculturally, and culturally, and it is in these
districts that Kasaaa rich people were in the majority. When Sanjeeva Reddy
did not evince much interest, the then Chief Minister ?rakasam, a man from
a Circar district with all his polities', hold in those districts, took
interest and sanctioned the bridge.--*
Then, bus transportation was the most important industry of the Circar
Kammas, the mainstay of the politicians of the area. With Sanjeeva Reddy
becoming the Chief Minister of integrated Andhra Pradesh, he took up
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the nationalization of bus transportation starting with the Krishna district
against mounting discontent from Circars in general because the nationalization
plan was aimed at nationalizing all bus transportation in all important
Circar districts one after the other. ^
Whenever discontent mounted against Sanjeeva Reddy, he gave a "post"
to a Circar Kamma or organized some high level conference of the Party and
government in those districts.
The other issue was the Krishna-Godavari water dispute between Andhra-
Maharastra-Mysore. It should be mentioned here that this was one of the
major issues for Alluri Satyanarayana Raju mobilizing his strength in the
Party and directing that strength against Sanjeeva Reddy during the period
of 1960-1962. On the Krishna-Godavari water dispute, passions were widespread
throughout the State over the possibility of injustice to the State. There
was criticism of Sanjeeva Reddy for his apathy on the issue and for his
attempt to keep up his own cordial relations with Mysore and other Central
96leaders as in the case of the 1966-67 steel plant issue.
The other most important and more recent issues for the 1967 elections
were the Godavari Road-Cum-Rail Bridge at Rajahmundry and the Steel plant at
Visakhapatnam. The Godavari Road-Cum-Rail Bridge over the Godavari River
near Rajahmundry was a demand of four Circar districts for about four years.
During that period a Congress worker or a youth leader had undertaken a fast
for every few months, and they had been given assurances by the Chief
Minister (Sanjeeva Reddy) several times.
The bridge, when built, will connect Calcutta, Vijayawada, Madras, and
Travancore by road, but it was more helpful to the people of the East and
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West Godavari, Vlzag and Srikakulam districts. The bridge required funds of
over one crore rupees. The demand of the Congress leaders of the area was
that Madras State was able to get things done at the Center for similar
bridges, but Sanjeeva Reddy was not pursuing the matter at the Center with
interest. The people of the area went to the extent of trying to raise half
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of the cost of the bridge, but they were only able to get "assurances."
The Visakapatnam steel plant issue was a more openly fought Issue
between Sanjeeva Reddy and Kasu, who was backed by anti-Sanjeeva Reddy
forces within the Congress, and between the Congress and combined opposition
parties. It was over this issue that an unusual condition prevailed in the
State just before the 1967 elections, leading to the circumstances that
reminded the nation of the 1953 Andhra linguistic violent agitation. And it
was over this issue that a little less than one-fourth of the Legislative
Assembly, all the opposition parties, resigned en bloc . Just before the
electioneering started, there were sudden outbursts all over the State,
particularly in Circars and Telengana, which led to large scale violence,
and transportation and communications were completely paralyzed. 98
Tenneti Viswanatham viewed the Center's attitude on the issue as a
"conspiracy against Andhras to kill the great movement for the fifth steel
plant." While the Swatantra leader, Latchanna, more accurately pointed out
that "the steel plant issue had become a victim of group rivalry and region-
alism in the Congress ranks." The Chief Minister, Kasu, said that the
denial of the steel plant would be "stark injustice" to Andhra.
On this steel plant issue Sanjeeva Reddy, the Chief Minister of the
State when the whole issue was taken up for the first time, and later
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Union Minister of Steel, was solely blamed by all sections of people in
Andhra, particularly by all opposition and Circar leaders. The feeling
against Sanjeeva Reddy on the issue was so high in the Circars that a bronze
statue of Sanjeeva Reddy, installed in Vijayawada City with great difficulty,
was broken into pieces and thrown into a nearby canal though it was under
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continuous police guard.
As in the case of the river water dispute issue, Sanjeeva Reddy was blamed
openly by both Congress and opposition members who believed that he was
trying to avoid any conflict or differences with the Congress President,
Kamaraj, and the Mysore Chief Minister, Nijalingappa, a Syndicate Partner,
by pressing for the steel plant. He was blamed for not making any decision
when he was Union Steel Minister and an important member of the Union
103Cabinet. In fact, Sanjeeva Reddy was accused in the State by the
opposition as well as Congress members in the Assembly for his not making any
sincere attempt to get any big Central industries located in the State.
Under these circumstances, one is "free to excite the losers in past
strife to new vengeance—and the victors to new aggrandizement," and cash
in on the outcome. That was what Chief Minister Kasu did to assert his
leadership position and his group's victory within the Party first and then
in the 1967 general elections.
No one will deny the fact that whether it be in India or the United
States local issues make a forceful impact on the minds of the people of the
locality. Chief Minister Kasu, first strengthened his position within the
Congress Party by using the same issues as mentioned above among the
legislators and then the P.C.C. members to win over the control of government
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and Party organization. He appointed the disappointed leaders In the Party
from different regions under Sanjeeva Reddy* s leadership: P. Tirana Paddy
was aade P.C.C. President, V.B. Raju vas made chairman of the highly paid
Road Transport Corporation, Sidda Reddy became president of the A. P. Land
Mortgage Bank and P.C.C. Secretary. All these important entl-Sanjeeva
Reddy leaders in the districts, discounted for years, were looked upon and
favored in their works. 10^
Then in the second phase Chief Minister Kasu's maneuverings included
the appointment of two more ministers, both from Circar districts, one from
the Nellore district to counteract the dissident leader, A.C., also from the
same district and to discount his position. This new minister appointed
from the Nellore district was a Kama, Chenchurame *'«idu. fe The second
minister was from the West Codavari district neglected by Sanjeeva Reddy for
years by not giving the district any representation in his earlier Cabinets.
In the Telenganaareas Kasu took up tho interests of the 32 member
National Democratic Front in the Assembly and initiated their becoming
full-fledged members of the Congress Party. He had already accommodated the
unemployed Telengana leader, V.B. Raju, earlier. In Rayalaseema he joined
hands with anti-Sanjeeva Reddy old Congress leader, I. Obula Reddy (Chairman
of the A.P. Agricultural University until the February 1967 election). Later,
with Sanjeevayya joining hands with his foe, Sanjeeva Reddy, Sanjeevayya's
personal rivals in the district politics who were otherwise followers of
Sanjeeva Reddy, became staunch supporters of Chief Minister Kasu's
official group.
ln
The episode of the P.B.C. eleventh member election has been dealt wjfc
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in Chapter III. Hie candidate selected by Kasu for that election was
Steelman Kakani. Kakani Venkataratnam was a long time popular and sincere
Congresa leader of the Krishna district and the leading figure of the anti-
Sanjeeva Reddy forces. Steelman Kakani long before the election in August
1966, when Sanjeeva Reddy-Sanjeevayya-Raghuramaiah and the A.C. group
Joined hands against Chief Minister Kasu, led a campaign among legislators
and P.C.C. members in support of Kasu leadership in the State and at the
sane time regretted Sanjeeva ''.eddy's meddling in State politics. A series
of Press statements containing the same by P.C.C. members and legislators of
each district were published in all the daily newspapers In the State.
After the decisive victory in the inter-Party election, the ministerial
group stage was the voters at large in the State. The P.C.C, President and
Kasu long before the elections of February 1967, during July-September 1966,
while canvassing for the P.E.G. election, met the district laaders and men
in the ring and won the moods of not only P.C.C. members who were voters for
the P.E.C. election but also of the voters of the 1967 general election in
general.
As the antl-Sanjeeva Reddy feeling was more deeply widespread throughout
the State, particularly after the November 9 convention of Congressmen,
Sanjweva Reddy went down to Hyderabad especially to distribute a written
statement to the Press aimed at placing "a few facts before the public to
clarify my position regarding the steel plant and to remove any misunder-
idings on this account in the public mind which, I know, certain interested
persons have ettttti !."*M Sanjeeva Reddy further said in his statement
that "some mischievous elements are going above misleading the public...
I
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know that this mischief is being done for political reasons.... It is (he
leaders (aiming at Kasu) who will have to make sacrifices instead of bring-
ing suffering to innocent people by fcelr selfish actions." 109 In his state-
ment it was also mentioned that he did not believe in "exploiting*' the feelingi
of the people of the State and ''whipping up emotions."110 The Hindustan
Times noted when Steelman Kakani won in the P.E.C. election against
Sanjeeva Beddy's candidate that, "Mr." Brahmananda leddy (Kasu), fully ex-
ploited the "conspiracy" of the two Central ministers "against the State
leaders" to his advantage and got rich dividends." 111 A correspondent of
The Times of India noted on this issue that "opposition parties in Andhra
are not immune from these features, and it would have been surprising if
they had not plu: ped for exploiting to the utmost in the impending general
election the feelings that have been roused among the people of the State
over the demand for the location of the fifth steel plant...." 112 When a
Press reporter asked the *.C.C. president whether tie steel plant issue would
affect the Congress Party chances at the polls, he said that "he did not
consider that the steel plant issue would affect the Congress chances for
the facts were before the people and also the emphatic manner in which the
Chief Minister had ably pleaded the State's case."H3
Chief Minister Kasu and his group also added to their credit along with
the Chief Minister's fight for the steel plant, the establishment of some
big public sector projects and the creation of a new South-Central Railway
Zone.! 14
Uot surprising/, the opposition parties, as noted in the first chapter,
were able to resign from the Assembly en bloc and were able to encourage
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some anti-social elements on the steal plant Issue. But they failed to
carry it down to the villages and to appeal *> the men in the ring in the
districts. Moreover, when the government, heeded by the Kasu group, itself
was so firm on the issue as any other opposition party was, and as the
Chief Minister's appeal to all those isen in the ring who had already been
impressed with his maneuvering* , the opposition message was not so sppealing
or attractive to the voters at large as to make an effect on them.*1^ Hov?
ever, the Impact of the steel plant lsaue on the 1967 elections together
with the organisational weakness of the Congress and the strength of the
Swstsntra Party in Srlkakulam and Vitag districts will be found in Chapter VI*
Except for Halgonda Zllla Parishad, all the other 19 Parlshada and more
than three-fourths of the 321 Panchystl Samifa in the State were firmly In
the grip of the Congresa Party—either In the hands of the Sanjeeva Reddy
group or in the hands of those who were antl-Ssnjeeve Reddy-supporting Kasu.
With the firm changeover of the State leadership from the Sanjeeva Reddy
group to Kasu, a change or shift of allegiances of those Panchyatl Raj men
was slso »e%n in favor of Kasu, ths man In power.
As Hugh Crsy pointed out, "Key figures In rallying support for Assembly
candidates sre the presidents of Panchyate Samlthls, who are powerful
Individuals able to dispense much patronage. 'lib These offices sfford
convenient levers to control the rural people. That is v. by the faction
leader in the Congresa and the Congress Parties make every bid first to
get control of these organisations, including cooperatives, as pointed
out by Paul Brass. 11 '
After becoming Chief Minister, Kasu slowly approached and appealed to
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the people in charge of those Ranchyati Raj institutions, through the
strongmen of the districts, as well as directly, and he was able to turn
the majority of them to his side. These strongmen of the district had
already been approached, and in fact, they were also part and parcel of the
ministerial group.
The administrative machinery, as mentioned in earlier chapters, was
paralyzed subsequent to 400,000 non-gazetted officers going on strike during
early January 1967. After prolonged discussions and negotiations which
dragged on until the end of January, the government announced a "pre-
election gift" of an "immediate D.A. raise and further promise to boost
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it to that of Central Government employees ." ' The Chief Minister also
announced that his "Government would introduce University Grants Commission
pay scales in all colleges" costing the State government rupees 13 crores
119per year. With these two announcements by the Congress government just
before the elections, no government employee was left out without a raise
in his salary. On the other side, the procurement rate of Paddy was already
increased to benefit the bult of the voting community—farmers.
Andhra Pradesh, being the rice bowl and franary, had not worried much
on the troubled food front in the country before the fourth general elec-
tions. The pre-election widespread discontent over rising prices was
compensated just before the elections with a raise in D.A. and the Paddy
procurement rate, both affecting about 60 percent of the voters. Many other
promises and assurances and, of course, some new schemes for agricultural
labor had already been taken up as usual.
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One of the main election issues of a few powerful independents like
Vavilala Copala Krishnayya, Praja Party Tennetl, Swatantra Party Latchanna,
and even the Communists in all the earlier elections was that of making
Telugu an official language. In January 1967, just before the fourth
general elections, Telugu was made an official language of the State before
electioneering further intensified the issue. 3-20
The much publicized cow protection agitation in pre-election India was
not at ell an election issue in Andhra Pradesh at the State level. In fact
the agitation itself had not entered the State nor had it become widespread
enough to affect the electorate* However, one M.L.A. resigned from the
Assembly on that issue, and a few Jan Sangh sympathizers attempted to spread
it outside the twin cities *mt did not succeed.
*
2*
A Svatantxa Party candidate said in Bombay before the elections,
"Swatantra would have had a 'landslide victory' if the Sankaracharya had
continued his fast. The breaking of the fast had taken away the Party's
adv^ntagea . Still, wherever there were sincere workers of Jan Sangh,
like Nellore, Vijeyenagaram, Bhimavaram, Rajahoundry, Nizaaabad ami Warangal,
they tried constantly to make the "cow' a major issue. But wherever they
tried to make it an issue, there were Right Communists who particularly
openly opposed the Jan Sangh activities Including their cow protection
agitation. The State Council of the Eight Communists passed a resolution
saying that its workers and people "should oppose the Jan Sangh activity
on cow protection agitation as it was trying to rouse passions among the
people on ie basis of caste and community.
"
12 ^ Further, the Congress
Goverment in the State was very careful to avoid tha cow protection agitation
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as an election issue* The Government hat! agreed in December 1966 to intro-
duce a legislation on cow slaughter. * 2^
Thus, most of the Issues which the opposition parties, individually
and unitedly, tried to make their important election slogans failed to
rouse any passions or response.
Money was an Important factor in the ability of not only the Congress
organization and its candidates but also of other parties and their can-
didates, too. And its impact, directly and indirectly, on the voter was
more visible than any other single factor mentioned. The Congress was able
to use not only much more money than any other party but also its candidates
were in a much better position to press in the money in their respective
constituencies. In addition, the Congress was sble also to encash the
government patronage, at Samithi, Parishad, and State level, in the forum
of more workers to work for it and more votes of minority communities.
All the parties and their candidates had known veil tne impact of
money in elections since foe 1955 elections when the Congress used all its
"command'' to collect "lump sums in amounts of hundreds of thousands of
rupees without detailing their expenditures.' It was freely assumed in
fact by all Involved in elections that much money was spent particularly
where the important personalities were involved. One who would be on the
election scene particularly in the last two or three days could find how the
pur. e strings would be loos. nad to win over the uncommitted among the voters.
In certain areas large su: s of money would be distributed through middlemen
—
"contractors." B. Nageswar Rao, a seasoned journalist in Andhra politics,
reported referring to the role of money in elections, "In most cases, the
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giver is not sure that the receiver will faithfully discharge his contractual
obligation*. It is, therefore, stipulated that the voters, if they are a
chuck, should refrain from exercising their franchise to qualify for the
payment." 126
Government patronage would be encashed in the form of votes by Congrsss
candidates. The local president of the Zilla Parishad or Samithi or a
Cooperative Society, who w*a extending hie support to the candidate, would
assure, promise or pass orders for a connecting road, a water tank, a Dhobhi
Khana, a coaaaunity listening set, a village labor housing society to Ilarijane,
a school or a building for any one of them, or a Job opportunity to the sons
or daughters of an important wan of the washermen, barbers, ??arijans or
to some other village minority community or association, in return for
their bulk votes. If the village were small and compact, the deal would
be for a bus roue to the village, a Cooperative Society, a school, a hospital,
a connecting road to the nearby town, or the repairing of a village temple,
and so on.
But where the voters of those minority communities were politically
miaded, they would accept the money from the candidate, not for the can-
didate's "conditions" which were to abstain from voting or to come and
stay in the candidate's camp before going for voting or not to allow any
other candidate or his men into their community. But candidates or their
followers might even compete among themselves to accept those voters'
conditions. For example, ir. !"avali, Mudinepalli, Vuyyuru, Tanuku, Pamarru
constituencies of Nellore, Krishna, East and West Codavarl districts, voters
of those minority communities in certain villages had accepted the money or
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other assurances or work from or by candidates, only if they were allowed to
exercise their vote.
Two tendencies in this process should be mentioned here. A tendency
on the part of the contesting candidates, whether it be a Panchyat election
or a general election, was that of "subscribing" or "donating" a lump sum
of money to a particular work or project the community was in need or
might like to have instead of paying money through a middleman. In this
way the candidate might not only develop more cordial relations with the
community, but also even if he were defeated, some of his works would re-
main as a sort of investment for his future. The voters in the community
or village also found this method acceptable because in the earlier "cash
payment system," they all did not know how much money was involved in the
"deal" between the middleman and the candidate. Moreover, because of an
increase in their political consciousness, the new method was more accept-
able than the earlier one.
t
This way, the particular community or village was also able to avoid
pressures from all sides by contesting candidates or their followers,
leading to groups or factions at village or community level. These voters
would ask the candidates or their agents to come to an understanding between
them so that they could cast their votes for the man who gave more or under-
took a "big work." In the Kandukur constituency, Nellore district, three
hundred voters of a compact village "put up a large banner at the entrance
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to the village that their votes would be available to the highest bidder."
Thus, candidates who were in possession of money or who were able to
mobilize the local moneyed men or who had the support of men in control of
66
the local Institutions always had better chances of winning an Assembly or
Lok Sabha seat. Congress Party and its candidates had all thoae advantages
over the other parties and their candidates. Those who had the above
advantages but were denied a Congress ticket contested in the election! as
independents with those factors as their "opening balance" or "stock in
trade."
The electioneering is becoming costlier election after election not
only because of the rise in prices but also because of competition among
contesting candidates.
The Congress Party in the State was able to collect about rupees 1,300,000
rots those who had applied for its ticket as a deposit besides their regular
annual membership fund and donations from the public. This money in
addition to its candidates' own expense, war; used for financing the few
financially weaker candidates, for supplying the wall posters, for pressing
into service transportation vehicles, for entertaining troops (drama,
Burrakatha), etc.
Yet another Congress election strategy was tc give Lok Sabha tickets
to industrialists or locally rich men, provided they were ready to contribute
to the Party election fund or to finance all those candidates contesting
for Assembly in that Lok Sabha constituency. In the Guntur district, the
Xarearao Peta Lok Sabha seat was given to a big business magnate, Maddi
Sudarsanem, th. Kasulipatnam seat to a local Zemindar, I. An!-in>ecu, and
the Ongolu seat to a cine actor, Kongara Jaggayya, all of whom were ready
to finance tie Assembly candidates.
In Andhra Pradesh, because of the bitter group rivalries with the
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Congress Party, the group leaders also financed their supporters. When a
Press reporter asked A.C., the dissident leader, about the election fund col-
lection, he said that there "might be truth in the allegations that the
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official group had collected rupees 5 lakhs from P.W.D. contractors."
His allegation was that the money so collected was being used only for the
official group. Writing on the Andhra Congress split and inner sabotage of
the Congress candidates, The Overseas Hindustan Times commented that
"prominent leaders will be special targets of the dissidents and a lot of
money and energy is proposed to be spent in seeming them out." The Hindu
commented that "many Congress candidates feel that if they are to retain
their seats, they will have to spend more and work harder."131 It fnrther
noted that "first and foremost is the feeling among opposition candidates
that the Congress is weaker than in the past and that alllttle more determined
132
effort in terms of men and money will be electorally rewarding."
The pattern of companies' contributions to political parties had under-
gone a significant change in the 1967 elections. The Congress and Swatantra
parties received the lion's share of companies' contributions. In the 1962
elections the pattern of company donations to Congress and Swatantra was at
70:30 rate; but in 1967 this rate had changed to almost 50:50 between both
133
parties.
In Andhra Pradesh, Congress has had contributions from all big busi-
nessmen though the details were not available. The Swatantra Party for the
first time tried, though unsuccessfully, to collect rupees one million for
elections in the State. The Party President, G. Latchanna, "appealed to
the workers of the Party to raise a fund of at least Rs. 10 lakhs to £ight the
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Congress in 150 constituencies."^^ The Left Communists were able to
collect rupees 150,000 within a few days before the electioneering started
in order to start a daily newspaper.
CHAPTER VI
TBI RESULTS
This chapter deals with an analysis of the results of the 1967 elec-
tions which were collected through various sources. This part, however,
is no statistical substantiation for what has been said in the earlier
chapters which described the setting, parties, candidates and the climate
of the political conmmity in Andhra Pradesh. It should be further made
clear, that as ne on-the-spot investigations were undertaker to interview
voters, candidates, party leaders and election officers, no attempt is
made here to build charts or graphs to reveal any voting behavior in depth
or voters* motives. ..hat is attempted in this chapter is to analyse the
impact of literacy on election turnout, the number of candidates contested
for each seat and its impact on the performance cf parties, and the pat-
tern of performance by parties in Andhra Pradesh since toe 1955-1957
elections.
Literacy and Voters* Turn Out
Though "whether mere literacy makes a person more knowledgeable In
politics is a debatable point:," particularly in the Indian context, there
is no doubt of a direct relation of literacy with the Increased voters'
participation in any voting. 135 The "percentage of people whe go to the
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polls will Increase with the increase of literacy. ^
However, irrespective of literacy, the election turn-out might increase
in the background of the prevailing political atmosphere. That is, if the
contest is between two popular and powerful candidates, they will make every
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bid to reach every voter and bring him to the polling station, or if the
constituency is politically advanced because of its involvement in the
Independence Movement, more voters might turn out.
But when there is an increased literacy, an increase in the election
turn-out is certain and will be accompanied by a fall in invalid votes*
Table No. 2 confirms this statement. However, it needs further exaplanation
and clarification.
The district wide level of literacy is given in the above table in
the order of its ranking. Though the election turn-out 6f the fourth
general elections mentioned in the fourth column in Table No. 2 does not
necessarily tally with the literacy rank in the third column, the table
indicates the difference between one district and the other on the basis
of their literacy rates. The percentages of invalid votes out of the total
polled mentioned in the fifth column further strengthens the influence of
literacy on voting patterns . The table reveals that where literacy is high,
the possibilities of educated voters invalidating their votes because of
their not knowing the procedure will be limited. But because of other
reasons, the invalid votes may not reveal any change in literacy. That
is, a voter may consciously invalidate his vote for reasons indicated
earlier.
The table indicates no change on the percentage of invalid votes even
when there was a high literacy and high turn-out of voters (Krishna and
Nellore districts). In those two districts, the election contests were
more bitter, their political consciousness was higher, and the political
climate was clouded with severe group rivalries in both the Congress and
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Communist Parties. It was in these two districts that the official and
dissident groups in Congress Party supported independents directly against
each other's candidate with an object of defeating the other. In fact,
voters often confused who was the Congress candidate and who was not between
an official Congress candidate and dissident supported independent or
vice versa. Those independents were even referred to as "cycle Congress"
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or "star Congress." The other reason for Krishna district which has
high literacy, showing 3.5 percent "invalid," was that for Vijayawada Lok
Sabha no election took place as Dr. K.L. Rao was elected unopposed. The
invalid votes of two city constituencies of Vijayawada were only 1.5 percent.
The Hyderabad district in the table in spite of its highest literacy
(35 percent) shows a low percentage of election turn-out. This was because
out of 17 Assembly constituencies in the district, six were outside the
city besides the villages included in city constituencies. Those villages
are backward with little education or other facilities. The high percentage
of 35 to the district is because of the high literacy rate in the twin cities.
Except in Charminar constituency, the other contests in the district were
neither bitter nor keen. The Cuddaph district indicates a comparatively
low turn-out and high rate of invalid votes; this was not only because of
its slight political consciousness but also because of lack of any keen
competition in the contests between the parties. On the other hand, the
Khammam district, which is often compared with the Krishna district for
its key role in Telengana politics, has registered comparatively high voters
(78.8) because of the high political consciousness in the district in general
and stiff fights between the two locally well organized parties—the Congress
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and Communists, which had almost equal strength before the elections. The
Nalgonda district with 68.8 percent of turn-out is similar to that of
Khammam.
Parties and Their Performances
From Tables No. 3 and No. 4 the performance pattern of different parties
in Andhra Pradesh elections since 1957 may be seen. Though in terms of
percentage of valid votes there is little to know about Congress, a look at
the seats won and their percenteges in total seats reveals a continuous
downfall. But the Congress Party seems to have a hard core of strength in
Andhra Pradesh. Not more than 10 seats have been lost by the Congress
Party since 1957, a loss which is insignificant in view of the wide gap
between the Congress strength and that of the major opposition party.
The Congress v A closer look at the Congress Legislature Party further
reveals that though the Congress won only 187 and 177 seats in 1957 and in
1962 elections, respectively, the strength of the Party was increasing with
another 20 to 30 members joining the Party ranks shortly before or long
before the electioneering for the next general elections approached. The
present strength of 165 members immediately after the 1967 election will
increase to over 200 by independents joining the Congress. Those who were
elected as independents in good numbers in 1967 had already started their
maneuvers to join the Congress—the group which was in power. For the 1955-
1957 elections the Ranga K.L.P. and Prakasam K.M.P.P. joined hands with
Congress on the eve of elections. Soon after the Congress strengthened and
stabilized its own position in the combined Assembly after the 1957 elections
in Telegana, this partnership came to an end. But as the 1962 elections
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approached, its strength again increase*: to slightly over 200 members. In
the 1962 elections, it won only 177 seats, but as the 19 7 elections approached,
its strength in the Assembly was 215. With the 1967 elections this strength
has declined to 165, but a group of about 30-35 members who were elected
m» independents have already formed a "Party", t e People's Democratic Party,
similar tc that found just before the 1967 elections, and are awaiting a
chance to loin the Congress treasure benches in the Assembly. In the 1962
elections sijc Congress candidates were unopposed, but in 1967 only two
candidates escaped the election contest.
When the total votes polled is taken into consideration, the performance
of Congresc candidates was far more on the reverse. That is, though there
was a slight increase in the total votes polled, the Increase in the average
votes polled by a Congress candidate was far below that of a similar Increase
in some other parties. This should also be viewed from the fact that there
was a ten percent overall increase in the total electorate in the State
over the 1962 electorate.
The average votes polled by each Congress candidate contested in the
1967 elections has increased to 22,193 (Table No. 4) from 18,411 in 1962,
making a 17.4 percent increase in the average votes polled by a candidate
in 1967 over his 1962 average. Whereas, the increase for a Swatantra Party
candidate was 43.4 and 61.5 for a Jan Sangh candidate. In this respect also,
the increase in the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh Parties represents a general
trend revealed in the 1967 elections in other parts of the country, par-
ticularly in Northern States. On the other side, the left forces in
general, Cornealsts and Socialists, decreased in their percentages.
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In the 1962 elections the Congress percentage of valid votes increased
from 41.3 to 47.4, but its percentage of seats fell. While the Communists 1
percentage of valid votes has fallen from 29.2 in 1957 to 19.53 in 1962, the
percentage of seats has increased from 12.3 to 17.0 for the same period.
That is, until 1962 the electorate viewed the Communists as an alternative
to Congress, ^Whereas, in the 1967 elections the percentage of votes polled
by Congress, Communists and Swatantra all fell, but Swatantra was able to
increase its seats over the 1962 seats. An increase in the percentage of
votes polled, matched by an increase in the percentage of seats captured
by the independents, Jan Sangh and the Republicans, is seen. The Praja
Socialists and S.S.P. not only lost their percentage of seats but also the
percentage of votes. The increase of votes and seats by the Republican
Party, without even having an organization in the State, was not because
of any improvements in its organization but only because of the voters' anti-
Congress feeling expressed in those two constituencies where it won. In
one constituency the President of the Republican Party was elected with the
lowest number of votes (12,543) in spite of certain sections of Congress
supporting him. While its second candidate, its Secretary, Eswari Bai,
polled even less than the president (12,401) as against the lowest votes
of 12,243 polled by any other successful candidate. The Congress candidates
in both these constituencies, Allavaram and Yellreddi, polled 8,625 and
7,959, respectively. The success of Eswari Bai was not important for
the voters especially to the official group Congressmen, nor was it their
concern, but defeating the dissident Minister Sadalakshmi, against whom
the Republican contested, was their concern.
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Jan Sangh . The success of three Jan Sangh candidates also occured in
the same way. However, the Jan Sangh did put some effort into revitalizing
the Party as a whole In those areas where it won. The cow protection
agitation issue was not responsible for their success at all. All three
seats the Jan Sangh won were the pockets where the merchant (Visya) community
was in good number, although not in the majority; Vijayanagaram, Nellor and
Parkhal, where it won, were the local towns; and those were the constituencies
where the dissident ministers belonging to those districts were greatly
involved in defeating the Congress official candidate. In Vijayanagaram,
the Minister, P.V.G. Raju, with whose support the Congress candidate won
in the 1962 election with over 30,000 majority votes over a Jan Sangh
candidate, was much concerned with defeating the Congress candidate, Bhattam
Srerama Murty, who forged a new alliance with Chief Minister Kasu's group
against the Raju. In Nellore, the dissident Minister, A. C. Subba Reddy,
without whose blessings it was difficult to win his home town, worked for
the defeat of the Congress candidate, an old leader, V. Raghavayy. In
Parkhal, Warangal district, the other dissident Minister, N. Ramachandra
Reddy, was involved as the other two dissident ministers were involved in
their home towns. As such, the success of two Republican candidates and
three Jan Sangh candidates and their fielding large numbers of candidates in
different constituencies was not an indication of their Party's strength at
the time of the 1967 election.
The Communists
.
Until 1967, the Communists in all the elections were
increasing the number of seats in the State Assembly, but there was a gradual
fall in the percentage of the votes they were receiving. In the 1967 elections,
both the Communist Parties together showed not only decreases in their
percentage of valid votes (about 4.0) but also decreases in the number of
seats and the percentage in the total seats (Table No. 4). This should be
viewed particularly from the fact that the Communists as a whole were
expected to capture about 100 seats in Andhra Pradesh Assembly.
The split in the C.P.I, camp, as such, has also cost them although not
in all the districts. The major drawback that they faced was that they
could not offer many leading personalities as candidates. The other draw-
back was that both the Parties divided the Communist vote in about 45
constituencies where they opposed and fought each other as bitterly as in
the fight between the Congress and Communist candidates in 1962. This
could be seen from the fact that even when all the other parties and in-
dependents increased the average votes polled by each of their candidates,
the Communist candidate, both left and right, together and separately re-
duced their average considerably. There was a decrease of 46.9 percent in
the average votes polled by a single Communist candidate, not to speak of
left or right, (Table No. 5). But there was not much difference in the
total votes they polled in 1962 and in 1967. Though the percentage of votes
polled by both the Communist Parties was only 4 percent less than their
share in 1962, the seats' percentage had gone down sharply fro.. ] in 1962
to 6.7 (Table No. 3).
Swatantra Party . Though the Swatantra Party appears from Table No. 3
and Table No. 4 to have increased its position in terms of the number and
the percentage of seats won and the total votes polled, in reality the Party
has not gained any strength outside the Srikakulam district than what it had in
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1962 or even when compared to it* forerunner, K.L.P., In 1955. That Is,
there were at least five to six successful candidates tc vhotr. the Swatantra
TV.rty loaned Its election symbol. Actually, all the 29 successful candidates
on the Swatantra banner were not its workers or even members. Two of t-:ose
successful candidates were given the Swatantra ticket when they were sus-
pended or refused by the Congress. There wer also three more candidates to
whom it lent its "star" symbol. One of these successful candidates, Raja
'ired I.'.S. officer who won the election on the Swatantra tickst
made it clear Boon after the election in a public meeting t*:at he was not
a Swatantra Tarty member but was an independent. There were two candidates
1 this from the ?*» llore district who contested the election on the
Swatantra ticket with an ultimate object of defeating the Congress ministerialists
candidates. The President and the Secretary of the Nellore District Cong-
ress openly supported and appealed for support to those Swatantra candidates.
Some of these candidates were even referred to as "star Congressmen". To
quote an interesting report of B. HegeeveY Rao, the JJellore district
Congress President,
"Mr. Chandra Sekhara Reddy and his colleagues have an
embarrassing situation /hen the Congress President, Mr. Kamaraj
during his visit to Sullurpeta, appealed to the voters to support
the local Congress canoiu^.e. As soon as the Congress President,
accompanied by the Chief Minister, left Sullurpeta, Mr. Chandra
Sekhara Reddy called back tie people and from the same dais ad-
vised tie voters to ignore the Congress President's appeal and to
vote for the Swatantra candidate! "138
Similarly,
"Mr. Trishna Reddy, the D.C.C. General Secretary, apcfce
from the same platform from which Professor I .G. Ranga addressed
a large public meeting in Kavali and endorsed the Professor's plea
for support to the Swatantra Party candidate. . .."*3 9
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In both these constituencies, the Swatantra candidates (star Congressmen)
won, defeating the Congress candidates.
The only district where the Swatantra Party had considerably Improved
and had solid success as a party against the Congress was in Srikakulam.
In Srikakulam, the home district of State Party Chairman Latchanna, the
Party improved from five seats in 1962 to ten in 1967. The personal hold
of Goutu Latchanna and his Individual effort to strengthen the party
organization contributed more than any other factor to the success of the
Swatantra Party in this district. Added to this, some of the Panchyata,
Panchyat Samithis, and Cooperatives were in the hands of Swatantra Party
(Latchanna) followers. However, the Vamsadara irrigation project, which
was neglected by Congress for years, and the steel plant issues in a small
way helped the Swatantra Party to mobilize their support.
The Swatantra Party was also cautious not tc field too many candidates
as in 1962. But still It could not successfully employ the "pocket
technique" of concentrating its strength in a few selected areas. The
total votes polled by the Swatantra Party in 1967 are significant. The
total votes polled by it in 1962 were for 140 candidates whereas the
increased votes polled in 1967 v;ere for only 80 candidates, including those
to whom it lent its symbol. But at the same time it should be recalled here
that the Swatantra Party had a problem in finding suitable candidates.
Upon probing further into the electoral results since the 1955 elections
in Andhra, it is seen that the Swatantra Party in the 1967 elections had not
improved or made any inroads in areas where it did not have any strength
even in 1955. The election success of Ranga-K.L.P. in 1955 in the Ancbra
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districts was similar to the election success of the Swatantra in 1967.
However, the Svatantra improved in 1967 in terms of seats in Srikakulam,
'lore, Anantapur and 1 urnool districts. It secured 7,5 and 10 seats in
the Srikakulam district in the 1955, 1962 and 1967 elections, respectively.
As stated earlier, the success of Swatantra candidates in Nellore was
not a success of the Swatantra Party. Of th« four candidates who won, only
one, Dhanekula -';arasimha«!, was an active party worker as a Ranga follower.
Of the .dates who won in the Anantapur aud /.urr.ool districts one
was not even a party member (Hadakaslra and iCodurauru constituencies). In
the Cuddaph district four Svatantra constituencies unseated Swatantra can-
ates, and only civ constituency returned a Svatantra candidate. One
sitting Swatantra member, '^dy, even after conducting a week day's
campaign as a Swat ty candidate for Pajenpeta constituency, on the
last day of nominations turned out as a Congress candicate for the same
Rajempeta constituency where he had been elected 1b 1962 as a Swatantra
candidate.
The defeat of ". n. Ranga in Chittoor Lok Sahha constituency in spite
of Congress nominating its candidates with no hopes of winning is a case
study for political analyst e Congress could not C told of any
suitable candidate until the last days of nominations. V: it was able
to persuade Changalraya * •
, a one-time MPl of iianga him-
selt. Ke was j.lso a brother of district Swatantra Party Chief , Krishnam
'du, whose, popularity -as r> ible for I earlier victory after
th« by-election . By nominating the one-tine close follower of Ranga
and a brother of the district Swatantra leader, the Congress was able to
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make inroads into Naidu families and their popularity and divide their
votes. At the outset, Changalraya Naidu agreed to contest against his
"guru", not to defeat him but to get nominated to Rajya Sabha when he was
defeated. 140
The pro-Sanjeeva Reddy Congress Party workers in the last days raised
the bogey of regionalism against Ranga. Since Panga was a native of the
rich Guntur district, their slogan was that if Ranga was so interested in
criticizing and defeating Congress, let him to to the rich circar districts
and contest from there. A Congress candidate, if elected, could get some
things done through the Congress Ministry, and what benefits had they gotten
"by electing a circar leader in 1962" was their question to the voters 141
Independents . From Table No. 3 and Table No. 4 it is found that in
the 1967 elections "Independents", who included the Praja Party and Majlis
candidate, reached an all time record both in terms 6f seats they obtained
and the percentage of votes polled. However, the average votes polled by
an independent candidate in the 1967 elections increased only 9.65 percent
over his colleague in 1962. But this record was because of the increased
number of independent candidates in 1967 (402) as compared with 1962 (302)
.
The percentage of votes polled by independents in Andhra Pradesh (Table
No. 3) has always been less than the average of all India. 14^ Over 50
constituencies had been electing these independents regularly. Of the 287
constituencies in 1967, 68 elected independents. Of them, three contested
as belonging to toe Ithehadul Muslim Party and one contested as belonging to
the Praja Party. Because of the rift-ridden Congress Party at all stages in
the State, the independents polled and won a record number of votes and seats.
Table 5. Independents won in 1962 and 1967
The average number Independents
No. District of contestants for Won in Won in
constituency 1962 1967
1 Srikakulaw 3.1 2 5
2 Visakhapatnam 3.6 3 A
3 East Godavari 4.1 3 1
A Vest Godavari A.l 1 A
5 Krishna 3.1 1 A
6 Nellore 2.1 1 A
7 Mahaboobnagar 3.1 A 6
8 Hyderabad A.
2
2 5
9 Nisanabad 7.0 2 A
10 Warangal A.
A
2 A
11 Chittoor 3.1 3 2
12 Cuddaph 2.1 A 3
13 Anatapur 3. 5 3
1A Kurnool 3.3 5 A
15 Guntur A.O A 2
16 Ad 1 lab ad 3.2 2 1
17 Karl&nagar 3.1 5 3
18 Medak 3.2 2
19 Khatreaara A.
20 Nalgonda A.l 1
Most of those 64 elected independents were either closely associated with
Panchyati Raj or cooperative bodies, or they were people with financial
resources or the backing of one section or another of the Congress Party.
From Table No. 5 it may be found that the more intense the division
within the Congress Tarty in a district, the larger the number of independents
who contested and won. That is, what the opposition parties together could
no achieve—by forging a united front against the ruling Congress—the inner-
Party groupism within the Congress Party had achieved in opposing official
candidates by pooling and uniting the resources and men of at least certain
opposition groups.
The larger the number of independents who won in Table No. 5, the
more intense was the "sabotage" of Congressmen against the official can-
didates and the more bitter was the groupism in that district. Where one
group of Congress was sufficiently strong, there, the other group could not
support or put up actively many independents. In four Rayalaseema districts
(Chittoor, Cuddaph, Anantapur, and Kurnool) where the dissidents were
strong, the number of independent candidates who contested and won decreased
over 1962. Similarly, in Guntur, Adilabad, Karimnagar, and Medafc districts
where the ministerialists were strong enough, the number of independent
candidates who contested and won was less than in the previous election.
In districts where tie groupism was deep tiere the number of contestants
for each constituency was high. But, in crucial districts like Nel-ore and
Krishna, where "men of prestige" of one group or fce other or both the groups
were involved, the number of contestants was less than in the other constit-
uencies. Because, in those presitge constituencies, every attempt was made,
as mentioned earlier, to forge an understanding with other parties, whether
it was Left or Right Communists or Swatantra, to nominate a common inde-
pendent. To mention a few examples, in Vuyyuru and Kudinepalli constituencies
where the steelmau Kakani and big businessman B. Tlanumanta Rao, key men of
the ministerial group were involved, there was only a common independent
against them, supported by all opposition parties and Congress dissidents.
In Nellore district where the dissident leader, A.C., was contesting, there
was an independent supported by the ministerialists and other opposition
p rties. In the neighboring constituencies there were also Independents
supported by dissidents and other*, against the Chief Minister's prestige
candidates, G.C. Kondiah and Chenchurana Naidu.
In the Kalgonda and Khammam distr'cts the number of candidates who
contested was high for a different reason than what has been said above.
In both the districts there were two Communists candidates belonging to right
and left in almost all the constituencies. These two districts were "red
forts" like Krishna ar.d Cuntur districts In Andhra areas for Communists. But
unlike in Krishna where the dissidents offered a stiff fight against t*»e
Congress ministerial candidates by nominating all party Independent can*' dates,
in Khax. iaxz there was no such effor by either the dissidents or the mlnisierials
to nominate united or all party independents. The dissidents were strong
In the district in every respect under Jalagam Vengala Rao leadership, leaving
no scope for any such united independents. As such, both the Communists
were left out to torn their own mat.
In the Kalgonda district no Congress group was sure of winning to many
seats—eight as against three in 1962—because of the well organised
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Communist strength and their hold over Panchyati Raj bodies. No independent
vas elected from this district before 1967, only Congress or Communist
candidates.
In Srikakulam J istrict, it was the independents supported by the
Swatantra Party and the Eobbili Raja, who won the election. In other dist-
ricts some of the independent who won were active Congress workers of one
group or another until the ticket issue stage vas completed. Of the A3
suspended Congressmen who contested for th* Assembly, 16 von the election
—
two of them on the Swatantra ticket and the rest as Independents with the
support of one group or another. Of the four suspended who contested for
Lok Sabha, one won the Nizamabad seat with the help of the dissidents.
The election of independents in 1 *rge numbers in Andhra Pradesh since
1957 can also be attributed to people at large "getting bored" with the
faction-ridden political parties and softening their attitudes toward a
partyless democracy. Though the election r»f independents in large numbers
was not because of any such intense attitude among the voters, the continued
election of independents as well as factions might lead to the clearing of
any obstacles from the way in popularising the partyleso democracy whic.: the
respected elder statesman "Cora ' 1 *s been attempting.
Pattern of Contests . The weakness of the Swatantra Party, as seen from
Table No. 6, vas that it could not withstand the competition of a larger
number of candidates. As the number of candidates in the contest increased,
its chances decreased. The Swatantra Party stood a greater chance of winning
when the contest was against the Congress in a straight fight. Of the 17
seats for which Congress and Swatantra contested opposing each other directly,
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Swatantra scored a great victory by wiuning in 11 constituencies.
No one will deny the fact that there is a relation between the number
of contestants and the number of seats the parties are able to win in Indian
elections. E.P.V. da Costa, Director of I.I.P.O. postulated his pre-poll
predictions cu the basis of the "Congress multiplier," That is, the more
rivals the Congress Party faces, the more seats It is likely to win.-^3
The "Cougress multiplier" as seen in Table No. 6 holds good only up
to a point (five candidates per seat) and than begins to fall. The law of
diminishing returns (Nitamabad districts where the average number of contest-
ants was seven, Table I<o. 5) and increasing returns in economics can be
applied to the Congress Party performance at I lis on the basis of the
multiplier. For the Swatantra Party, when the multiplier facU r is applied,
it is the law of diminishing returns that applies more effectively.
Hard Core of Congress . As seen from Table no. 7, the strength of the
Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh lies Ln ^bout 80 constituencies which
could be described as the hard core of the Congress Farty or the Congress
candidate. It was these constituencies that were responsible for keeping
the Congress in power without any uncertainty.
Of these 80 hard core Congr*. ^s constituencies, 43 were returning thu
Congress candidates almost customarily while another 37 or 40 constituencies
were definite in returning the Congress candidate.
In all, in the 1967 elections the Congress was defeated in 80 constit-
uencies where it was elected in earlier elections. But, at the same time
it gained 71 constituencies from ether parties or independents, thu. losing
its grip on only nine or twelve constituencies in all. But to compensate
that gap there was a fall in the total constituencies in the State from 300
in 1957 and 1962 to 287 In 1967.
However, Congress loat the confidence of 40 constituencies in the 1967
elections which had returned it to power In all the earlier elections from
1955 to 1967. Another A0 constituencies vhich elected c. real in 1962 did
not opt for Congress for a second tlaa In the 19*7 elections. Thus, 80
constituencies in all let the Congress candidates down In 1967 for different
reat >ns
.
It may be further said from Table No. 7 that the election of Congress
candidates in 37 constituencies for the second time in 1967 does not indicate
a general "favor for Congress" as strongly as the "dislike for Congress'* was
indicated in the SO constituencies which did not vote for Congress for the
second or third time.
A look at the district-wise details in Table No. 8 further reveals that
despite the anti-Congress wave in the circar districts (which was directed
against Sanjeeva Peddy with his pre-election strategies by Kasu) as seen from
the high number of defeats for Congress In those areas where It won in
earl'er elections, ttie gains for Congress in 1967 were also high, with the
exception of Srikakulam district where the Swatantra Party instead of the
ministerial group was able to encash the situation combined with its organi-
sational skills.
The hard co~e of the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh also lies in the
key districts of circars as seen from Table So. 8. These districts are
East Godavarl, Krishna, Guntur, and Wei lore. The har- ! core may be found here
because of the important role these districts played in the Indien Independence
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Movement. But, surprisingly enough, the Hyderabad district was also a hard
core for Congress. The Congress Party regularly won in eight constituencies
out of a total 17 or 18 constituencies in the Hyderabad district.
It was again in those hard core circar districts that the Congress
groupism was more bitter and prevalent at all levels than in any other
district in the State. It was in these districts—the heartland of Andhra
Pradesh—that literacy, transportation and communication, and the standard
of living were high. Farming communities are predominant in these distrifts
with the exception of Hyderabad. All the important cities, both politically
and commercially, are in those districts and their political consciousness,
among all sections of people, is considered to be high.
The Rayalaseeca districts, as seen from Table No. 8, though they returned
a good number of Congress candidates in 1967 for the first time, they were
not the hard core upon which Congress could depend. In Telengana the picture
since 1957 had never been formidable enough to worry the Congress Party.
Except in the "Red Zones"—Nalgonda and Khammam districts up until 1967—
the Congress Party had always had enough commandable strength over the
Telengana masses including Hyderabad, as seen earlier. This strength might
be the result of a spill-over effect of the Nizam rule and in particular
Kasim Razvi's hostile activities in the area. By capturing more seats in
the Red Zone and by Dr. R.V. Narayana Reddy joining the Congress, the
Congress Party won in 23 constituencies for the first time as agafcist 17
constituencies in which it lost its control in Telengana in 1967.
The Swatantra Party, as seen from Table No. 7, had only five constit-
uencies where it had been winning since the 1955 and 1962 elections. Both
the constituencies where it won for the third time and two of the three
constituencies where it was re-elected in 1967 for the second time were in
the Srlkakulam district. It lost seven constituencies where it had won in
1962. That is, the "doubtful seats' 1 for the Swatantra Party were more than
any 'sure seats". But to Its credit 25 out of the 29 constituencies it won
elected a Swatantra candidate for the '"irst tine. On the other hand, the
Swatantra Party's keeping all these constituencies in the 1972 elections,
provii id they do not slip out of its hold before that time, is uncertain.
Though the Communists increaaed their number of seats in the State
Assembly during 1955 and 1967, their grip over the constituencies was also
cracking simultaneously as seen from Table No. 7. The big breakdown of their
grip over 42 constituencies in 1967, however, was followed by a sharp decline
in the number of their seats in the State Assembly.
The Communists in Andkra Pradesh, despite the feelings that they might
come to power one day, had only one constituency in 1967, as compared with the
43 of Congress, that elected a Communist for the third time and six constit-
uencies that elected a Cotrnuniet for the second time.
XI s "independents were better placed than the Swatantra Party and
had almost an equal hold over the constituencies in tie State. There were
six constituencies which returnee independents for a second time In 1967.
There was one independent, Vavllala Copala Krishnayya, a prominent member of
Andhra Assembly from 1952, who was elected for the third time in 1967 in
spite of all out efforts by neighboring Chief er constituency workers;
In the 1967 elections 45 constituencies i.ad elected independent candle ates
for the first time while only 26 constituencies which had elected Independents
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earlier rejected them.
Recruitment Process . Tables No. 7 and 8 reveal the constituencies as
they were represented by parties and independents in elections since 1955.
Table No. 9 indicates the recruitment process of parties as indicated by
the elected members to the Assembly from each district in the '1967 elections.
It is needless to mention here that the broadening recruitment process is
one of the important indicators of trends in the modernization of the political
system.
Broadened recruitment to the State Assembly and Lok Sabha is one of the
silent and encouraging features of the fourth general elections in Andhra
Pradesh. Never before in earlier elections had so many fresh candidates,
belong to whatever party, been elected to the State Assembly.
As seen from Tables Number 9-A and 9, of the 287 M.L.A.'s elected in 1967,
about 157 had never entered the Assembly before 1967. While only 97 were in
the earlier Assembly. Of the 157 M.L.A.'s elected for the first time, 100
members were earlier experienced either in a local Panchyat, Panchyat Saaithi
or Zilla Parishad, in a cooperative, or in some other organization.
The party-wise division of recruitment as elected to the new Legislative
Assembly in the 1967 elections is seen in Table No. 9-A.
As seen from Table No. 9-A in all the other parties except the Congress
Party the percentage of new recruits is above 50, while in Congress it is
only 38.6 percent. However, 38.6 percent of new recruits in Congress looks
definitely better when viewed from the standpoint of previous elections. Of
the 77 Congress sitting members who were re-elected in 1967, 26 members were
elected for the third time since the 1955 elections in comparison with the 43
constituencies (Table No. 7) which elected Congress members for the third
time during the same period. That is, 26 constituencies out of the 43 were
returning the same persons who belonged to the Congress Party to the State
Assembly, Seventeen constituencies, while voting for Congress regularly,
changed their representation more than once. The remaining 51 sitting
members were elected to the State Assembly for the second time since 1962.
But all of them were not re-elected from the same constituencies where they
had been elected in 1962. There were only 34 constituencies (Table No. 7)
which were returning Congress Party candidates as compared with 51 members
who were elected for the second time. That is, only 17 members were able
to get elected from one constituency or the other.
The 24 ex-members elected in the 1967 elections had either been defeated
in 1962 or in 1957 or in both. Of these, six were from Guntur district itself,
mostly defeated in the 1962 elections by Communist Candidates.
A Silent Revolution . A silent revolution within the voters at large in
Andhra Pradesh can be observed from Table No* 10. Despite the fact that
Congress won a clear majority in the State as in earlier elections, the
voters have expressed their disfavor of the sitting members, particularly
those members of Congress, more than ever before.
Of the 169 sitting members contested, only 77 or less than half were
re-elected by voters. Though some districts elected more Congress members in
1967 than in 1962, they defeated the sitting candidates and elected fresh
nominees. Though there was sabotage of one group against the other to
defeat the important candidates who were all sitting M.L.A.'s, a clear verdict
of the voters, for a change, showed that a change for new people rather than
Table 10. Silent revolution
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Sitting Sitting Seats Obtained
District Seats Contested * Won 1962 1967
Srikakulam 19 iU 2 13 U
Vizag 18 11 3 12 9
East Godavari 21 21 8 18 11
West Godavari 16 10 U 10 10
Krishna 17 8 h 10 13
Guntur 2b 8 7 11 19
Nellore 16 13 h IU 6
Chittoor 15 8 2 7 9
Cuddaph 11 3 1 2 7
Anantapur IU 5 3 7 7
Xurnool 15- 7 3 9 6
l'^ahaboobragar 13 3 3 9 7
Hyderabad 17 12 10 16 11
Medak 10 6 3 6 8
Nizamabad 8 7 3 6 3
Adilabad 8 5 u - 6 6
Karimnagar 13 10 5 8 9
Warangal 12 6 2 7 5
Khammam 8 3 3 3 7
Nalgonda 12 h
±59
3
77
3 8
:
* Sitting included those who were elected in 1962 elections as
independents but who joined Congress afterwards
a new party was evident.
Thla nay be justifiable on the part of Che voters. No party was able to
offer a stiff fight against the Congress to win the voter' confidence as
every one of those parties, like Congress, was in the doldrums. Deprived of
financial resources, betrayed by its legislators who jumpec on the Congress
bandwagon, and lacking in suitable ca;. 'tdates, the Swatantra Party to the
disappointment of many failed to impress the voters.
I almost all Andhra districts, in particular fte circars, with the ex-
ception of Chief Minister's Guntur district, the voters refused a large number
of sitting M.L.A.'a. In Guntur, Khammam, Nalgonda, and Hyderabad the sitting
K.L.A. 's were elected in good number mostly because of a lack of capable and
known opposition candidates. At large, the Andhra Pradesh voters closely
followed the general trend that was expressed in the fourth general elections
all over the country.
The voter's hostile attitude towards the sitting K.L.A. 's included not
only the Congress but other parties as well (Tables No. 9 and No. 9-A) . Of
the 29 Swatantra candidate: elected, 22 were elected for the first time.
Similarly, of the 19 Cor^nunists (of both the parties) elected, only seven
were sitting and ten for the first tide. The independents who contested in
1967 were either ex-members of the Assembly or individuals refused tickets by
Congress who were also refused by the voters. Sixteen independents of the
43 candidates who bad be&n suspended by Congressmen and who won were mostly
new to the election fray. Out of the 64 independents elected, only four were
sitting and seven ex-iaei bera. Of the ten elected candidates belonging to
different minor parties, only two—one each belonging to the ithehadul Majlis
and Praja Party—were sitting and the rest of the eight were new and were
elected for the first time.
The factionalism in Congress Party as well as the split within the
Coiaravniits has greatly helped and caused the recruitment of larger numbers of
new people to tiie Assembly than ever before.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
"Parties are fighting for power rather than for principle.
But surely that is in the nature of any working democracy. Most
democratic politicians are not, and cannot be, philosopher-kings.
They have to build a majority by means which are often humdrum
and unedifying but which reflect the needs and impulses of a free
society. Only in distatorships, or in democracies doomed to early ...
failure, evm we likely to find ideological purity and consistency."
A Vote for Change : By and large, the verdict of the fourth general
elections in India, including Andhra Pradesh despite its returning the Con-
gress with an absolute majority, was a protest against the old guards of
power politics. This protest was recorded necessarily on non-ideological
considerations. All that voters wanted was a change in their representatives.
As the left wing leader of the Congress Party in Parliament, S.N. Misra,
has rightly put it,
"The general election has been the revolt of the people against
the status quo and those who seemed to uphold it. The Congress, of
late, has not been able to present itself as the Party of crusade
and change and had been steadily identified in the public mind as
the agency for maintaining the status quo." 1 5
This revolt against the Congress status quo could be seen in Andhra Pradesh
from the fact that so many long-standing key personalities in district
politics were defeated, and at the same time many fresh candidates who
contested for the first time were elected.
If a political party is an "organization formed for the purpose of
winning elections in order to get control of the directing personnel of
government" as defined by £. E. Scaattschneider, the political parties in
Andhra Pradesh, including the groups or factions within the Congress, are
in no way anything more and nothing less. *6
The minor parties—Jan Sangh, Republicans and Socialists, and the persona-
lity minor parties—Praja Party, Democratic Party and Ithehadul Majlis, play
a role of useful buffers, as described in Duverger, to one party or another,
usually to one group or another in the Congress Party.
A Boost From Factions : The success of Congress in Andhra Pradesh in
the fourth general elections is an obvious fact. The influential, wealthy
landlords were in the Congress. While the parties, particularly Swatantra,
could not kick the ball into the goal in spite of its having some rural
appeal because of Rytu Ranga and Sardar Latchanna.
Local problems, the clash of local personalities, usually in Panchyatl
Raj, group rivalries and ministerial patronage were the determining factors
for the success of Congress—the success of ministerialists. For only they
were able to catch the attention of the men in the ring in the districts.
But what the opposition had failed to do was to bring up a united front
against the ruling Congress which the internal differences among the
Congressmen could have achieved for them.
The reason for the continuous existence of groupism within the ruling
party, and for dissidents always running around the Congress Party even when
they were sent out or resigned themselves, was that when there are groups or
factions, the party rank and file finds itself actively engaged in some
political activity and its works will be easily accomplished at the district
or State level.
Pastime Politics : The Congress Party has many institutions and organiza-
tions down to the village level in its control, for which elections or selections
will always be going on. That is, people will always be aspiring to enter
into these "bodies" and to capture their control. The factions and groups
are keeping the leaders and followers from village upwards active, and are
taking part in the party organization (in one group or another). Particularly
for those people who are in the Krishna and Godavarl rich coastal deltas in
Andhra Pradesh, politics and so the elections are a good pastime which they
can afford. The rise and fall of groupism and its bitterness is always
found in those areas at all levels. For people in these areas, as Almond
and Coleman pointed out "Politics has become the avenue for personal advance-
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ment..." and they are "tremendously politicized" in this process.
Kept Opposition : After the 1967 election, from among the 69 inde-
pendents elected, two parties were formed again as wings of different
Congress factions. The People's Democratic Party, one of the new parties
formed in the Assembly from among the independents, extends its support
with 34 members as its strength to the Chief Minister. The other party,
consisting of 23 (independent) members, sometimes calling itself the Jana
Congress, extends its support to the dissidents in the ruling Congress Party.
Following the 1967 elections, the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly
presented a unique picture for any case study of an Indian legislature.
There was no official opposition party in Assembly. The newly formed
People's Democratic Party was the main opposition party with 34 members as
against 29 Swatantra, 10 Right Communist, and 9 Left Communist. But their
business in the House was more to support the Congress-ministerial group,
rather than to act as an opposition party. These "crypto-opposition" or
the "kept" opposition groups in the Andhra Assembly, were only awaiting an
early chance to join the Congress treasury benches. ^9 In fact, some of
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them—all the prominent ones In both the new parties—were debarred or
resigned, themselves, from the party just before February 1967. By May
1967 rumors were already afoot in the State that very soon they might join
the Congress. ^>° Thus, the strength of Congress when these "kept Parties"
are taken back will again be 215 or 220 members in the Assembly as usual.
The groupism at various levels in Andhra Pradesh is contributing to
the increased competitiveness in politics, and this competitiveness is not
primarily between ideologies or castes but between political groups cutting
across all those lines. Tne groupism has also helped the political system
to recruit more and more "new blood" into body politics.
In Andhra Pradesh politics there is always a negative feeling towards
a leader or candidate rather than a positive feeling that dominates the
coalitions of groups or factions. Then, it is the personal interest and
pressure of power that influence one's political behavior when he is "in"
an organization or leading a group. Caste might play a role but only after
the above factors. But all these factors will be changing their order
of places depending upon the issue, the personality involved, and the pres-
sures at work.
Regional Factors ; When a nation faces internal disorders, it tries
to unite its people by focusing animosities and frustrations on some ex-
ternal enemy. •**- In a similar way, a political party or a faction, when it
faces a near collapse or crisis situation, does not hesitate to divert the
attention of its members and the public in general by arousing regional feelings
or by supporting an agitational approach, thus enabling the party or group
to keep up its power or existence.
The faction-ridden Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh, particularly the
ministerialists, which had to fact at the polls not only a mounting dislike
towards the party, as such, but also had to fact the fact that its own party
dissidents, having no other choice to keep up the party, took up the issues
such as the steel plant, the Godavari Bridge and the neglect of the Circar
districts by Sanjeeva Reddy. These agitational approaches served well as
a "rallying cry" for the ministerialists and so for the Congress Party.
With an increase in the rate of population mobilization following the
emphasis on rapid social and economic change, there was also an increase in
the demands made on the government. These increased demands were taking the
turu of continued agitations as had been occuring in India—over a steel
plant, river water utilization, and location of a university or other cen-
tral project. William J. Foltz observed that this mobilization was essential
for building national sentiment. Although such mobilization is essential
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and unavoidable, it is leading to and arousing regional sentiment.
Caste or Opportunism? It is obvious that the increased political
consciousness coupled with the universal franchise opened up the field of
political pwer to those majority castes who were left out of the sharing of
power before independence. In fact, in all the Southern States the Brahmins
who ruled almost unopposed until the early 1950' s have been totally eliminated
from the political scene. (With Rajaji in Madras, Hanumantayy in Mysore,
ans with Pattabhi, Prakasam and Burgula fading out from Andhra State
Politics). In Andhra Pradesh this meant a shift of political power from the
Brahmins to the Kammas (Ranga, Chandramouli, Anjaiah Anne) and then with
the Reddy areas of Telengana amalgamating with Andhra areas, the political
power has shifted to their hands (Gopala Reddy, Sanjeeva Reddy, Brahmananda
Reddy, Cheima Reddy). A shift in favor of the "Harijans" or less privileged
also could easily be found in Andhra politics with a good number of them
becoming important personalities (Kurmayya, Sanjeevayya, Raghavulu, Kota
Eunnayya, Ramaswamy).
Though one cannot yet strike down the importance of caste at different
stages of the election process, one should also be careful to understand
that caste becomes a detriment when other things are equal in a constituency.
But usually, other things are never equal, and no caste has one political
allegiance as alleged by Selig Harrison or as referred to by Almond and
Coleman and by many other writers. 5 However, there are leaders who still
look to their caste for support while, at the same time, supporting another
opposing caste and opposing their own on other issues.
Moreover, it is not exactly the caste that will be at work in politics.
Opportunism is often mistaken for a caste force. The voters are not so
blind as to vote for a particular candidate because he or his party men say
that so and so belongs to such and such caste because they know that the
same candidate or leaders will be canvassing for another caste against their
own in some other village or constituency. This is at the voter's level.
At the political group level one cannot point to a group and say that it
is a caste group. The groupism, if one deeply looks into it, is weakening
the caste strength. It might be easy to say that groupism is based on caste.
In Andhra Pradesh Reddles aligned with the Kammas in one group who had been
enemies until the day before. In another group Kammas joined hands with
Reddles against their own Kamma leader and vice versa. But certainly the
campaigners wish to use "caste" as a vote catcher.
Aa John Grigg has pointed out, the caste In Indian politics "is no
more apparent than the class basis of British politics.
"
15^ as he further
rightly observed, "Caste is a strange amalgam of fossilized 'trade unionism',
snobbery, superstition, and color-consciousness." 155
Panchyati Raj ; Since the introduction of Panchyati Raj , a clear shift
of political power from the Center to the State and from the State capital
to the Zilla Parlshads and the Panchyati Samithis is clearly seen. Not
only the leaders are much interested in heading these Panchyati Raj bodies
and in remaining in State politics rather than going to the Center, but
also the voters are evincing a similar interest in Panchyati Raj affairs and
State politics.
In the allocation of party tickets it became a problem for the Congress
Party to nominate its Assembly candidates because of the five to six appli-
cants for each Assembly constituency in comparison with two and three for
a Lok Sabha constituency. In fact, there was no quarrel or major dis-
agreement between the groups over the distribution of Lok Sabha tickets.
Tet another tendency that has been developing among the State leaders
and the electorate in general is their reduced concern over the Lok Sabha
candidate and his capacities and qualifications. This could be seen from
the easiness with which they select and elect a candidate. But a Lok Sabha
candidate is ultimately expected, upon his elections, to take up bigger
issues at the national level and to take a major part in the conducting of
national affairs. Efficient conduct of national affairs is equally im-
portant if not more significant than the State legislatures. What will the
future of national politics and Lok Sabha be if this tendency continues is
a big question.
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As it has been at the center, after Nehru, a major role is played by
local district leaders in the State politics rather than a few "elder" or
"Kept" leaders. This process ultimately is helping to infuse new blood
in Indian politics at all levels.
The Panchyati Raj bodies were responsible for many candidates entering
the election field as independents in Andhra Pradesh. Many of those who
were getting elected to the Samithls and Zilla Parishads were aspiring
to become active in State politics. To accommodate all those aspirants was
a problem for the Congress Party. When it failed to give its ticket to
those Panchyati Raj men, they resigned from Congress to contest as independ-
ents or were debarred from the party when contested as independents or on
some other party T s symbol.
The success and strength of the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh lies
with the control of these Panchyati Raj and cooperative bodies in districts.
The Swatantra Party, which was in control of the majority of Samithis and
cooperatives in the Srikakulam district, was able to win more seats in the
election. Most of the independents who were elected in 1967 were either
presidents or former presidents of Panchyats, Samithis or Zilla Parishads
or active members of these bodies and their district cooperatives. The
success of a large number of independents and their continuous increase
since the 1955 elections as the Panchyati Raj movement extends all over the
State further confirms the fact that the control of these bodies is an
Important factor in deciding who wins the Assembly or Lok Sabha seats. In
fact, as pointed out by Hugh Gray, the introduction of democratic decentrali-
zation has turned the State politics into an amalgam of Zilla Parishads,
Samithis, and village politics. 156
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candidate and defeated him. After his election in 1962 as an independent, he
was taken back into Congress. But again in 1967, as the groups changed, he
was refused the Congress Party ticket.
6*Chief Minister Kasu supported indirectly all those independents who
contested against dissident leaders, Sanjeevayya, Sanjeeva Reddy and other
important dissidents like Food Minister Balarama Reddy, Women's Welfare
Minister Sadalaksmi, Agriculture Minister A. C, and former Minister S. B. P.
Pattabhi Rama Rao. On the other hand, the dissidents encouraged and helped
those independents when they contested against the Chief Minister Kasu, Steelman
Kakani, Battam Sreerama Murty, G. C. Kondiah, Obula Reddy, B. Manumanta Rao,
and A. Bapineedu, all key supporters of Chief Minister Kasu.
G^For example, for the Guntur Assembly constituency, the Congress candidate,
C. Manumayya, financed two Muslims to "contest" as independents against
himself so that he need not worry even if he did not get the votes of these
Muslims. Otherwise his other strong rival who had equal chances of winning
might manage to get their votes.
^Sreenivasa Reddy, who contested on the Swatantra Party ticket against
Sanjeeva Reddy, was refused a ticket by Congress. B. Rajaratna Rao, who con-
tested against Sanjeevayya in 1962 as an independent and missed narrowly, con-
tested in 1967 as a Swatantra Party candidate for his symbol might get him a
few more votes to fill the 1962 gap. Another candidate, B. Raja Rao, who
retired from the Revenue Board to contest as a Congress candidate was not pre-
ferred by Congress. As such, he applied for a Swatantra Party ticket.
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6/4he Hindu . (Madras), December 26, 1966.
^Mara Reddy, a sitting Swatantra Member even after the Party had nominated
him for an Assembly constituency in Cuddaph district, finally at the last
minute was successful in securing a Congress ticket to contest from the same
constituency where he had been nominated earlier by the Swatantra Party.
°"Mydukur and Rayachote Assembly constituencies.
67He polled 45,000 votes.
68ihe Hindu
.
(Madras), December 9, 1966, December 25, 1966, and, The Times
of India . (Bombay), December 10, 1966.
^Though the keeping out of Communists and Swatantra from contesting
against Raghuramaiah was often attributed to the caste factor, the truth, as
known personally, was that Kotta Raghuramaiah, a barrister and a one time
Under Secretary in the composite Madras Government, will always enter into a
tacit agreement with opposing parties at the personal level either on the
basis of extending his followers 1 support to them in the other Assembly
constituency or by way of "contributing" some money. In the 1962 election he
was able to make use of his boss, Defense Minister V.K.K. Menon, to withdraw
any Communist candidate against him as was for Menon. Raghuramaiah then held
the Portfolio of Defense.
70Of the two Communist candidates for the two Vijayawada Assembly seats,
one was the editor of the Right Party daily paper, and the other was a full-
time Party worker with no rural base. Similarly the candidates for Guntur,
Eluru, Nellore, and Visakhapatnam city Assembly constituencies were full-
time Party workers. Most of them were either looking after trade union
affairs or Party offices.
71-Politbureau Member, M. Basava Punayya, said that "Leftists like Mr.
Sunadaryya, Mr. B. T. Randev, and Mr. Surjit had decided not to contest...."
The Indian Express
.
(Vijayawada), December 23, 1966.
'^Against Right Secretary Rajasekhara Reddy, the Left had put up a new and
young Leftists, mobilizing all their men and material in the area. While when
Left Leader T. Nagi Reddy contested from Anantapur constituency, the Rightists
had put up a young and new candidate. Left Leader Rajasekhar Reddy is a
brother and Right Leader Nagi Reddy is a brother-in-law of Congress Sanjeeva
Reddy. All of them contested from the same Anantapur district.
73
'-'The Jan Sangh candidate for Nalgonda Assembly constituency, who tried
to get the Congress ticket but did not succeed when he approached for the
Jan Sangh symbol at the last minute, was from Hyderabad City.
'^But in the 1962 elections he contested as an independent. In 1967 he
contested on a S. S. P. symbol and lost his deposit also in the contest.
75The only constituency where the Socialists were able to win.
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76B. V. Ramanayya, President of the State Party contested both from Allavaram
Assembly constituency and Amalapuram Lok Sabha constituency against his old
personal rival, a Union Deputy Minister, B. S. Murty. The second Lok Sabha
candidate, G. Arun Kumar, filed his nomination for Assembly but withdrew at the
last minute in view of his 1962 experience when he had lost his deposit also.
''Election took place only for remaining 40 Lok Sabha seats in the State.
78In 1967 G. Rajaran and K. L. Narasimha Rao, two sitting Congress M.L.A.'s
were declared elected unopposed, as such elections were held only for 285
constituencies
.
79A11 the candidates of the Communist Parties who contested against a
rich landlord or a former Zamindar were from a poor or below middle-class
or working-class family.
""Please see Chapter V for some discussion on this subject.
SlJoseph R. Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern
India," Pacific Affairs
.
(Summer, 1965), p. 133.
82Ibid.
8
-*Taya Zinkin, Reviewing a book by Sirsikav, op., cit .. in International
Affairs, (January, 1967), pp. 171-173.
B^The "electorate" is used here with reference to the village and Samithi
leaders whose efforts and actions over the electorate's behavior at large is
overwhelming.
85in both the Communist Parties, the urban politician always has a say
in Party politics, and in many districts they dominate the Party organizations.
The Swatantra Party has no hold at all in any of the towns or cities in the
State except their offices.
86Joseph R. Gusfield, pjn cit
. ,
p. 126.
87Phillip G. Altabach, "The Indian Political Scene on the Eve of the 1967
Elections," Orbis, (Fall, 1966), p. 885.
88U8ually if the local landlords and businessmen who have considerable
influence over the elector ate are not directly involved in those organizations
in the area, the men who are involved will be either their partners or colleagues
in the case of their not being political opponents. The M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s
are usually the members of these organizations. All these people in control of
those organizations could be called "men in the ring".
89Ram Joshi, "Political Problems, Practices and Institutions in India"
(paper read at the annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies,
Chicago, March, 1967), p. 15.
90ibid.
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91Paul Brass, op_. cit.
,
p. 238.
^^When Sanjeeva Reddy resigned following the Supreme Court Strictures,
he nominated Kasu Brahmananda Reddy to succeed him as Chief Minister.
^This bridge, named after Frakasam, served as the connecting link of two
parts of Andhra; the commerce of the area was doubled, and the possibility of
Guntur and Vijayawada cities forming a corporation in the near future was
brightened.
QAHA case against the government decision on bus nationalization in
Krishna district was at the High Court and later at the Supreme Court for
months on the charge that the decision made by Sanjeeva Reddy's Ministry
was politically and personally aimed. The case was struck down in favor of
the State government. But strictures were passed against the then Minister
for Transport, S.B.P. Pattabhirama Rao, a Kamma from Circars, who was made
a minister by Sanjeeva Reddy to carry out this decision of nationalization.
It should also be mentioned here that nationalization was not intended in
the Nellore district where over 80 buses were owned by a Reddi supporter,
Mir Alikhan. The Supreme Court, however, had passed strictures against
Sanjeeva Reddy himself on the same issue when the bus nationalization was
extended to the Kurnool district. The owner of the buses in Kurnool, who
was a friend of Sanjeevayya, then political foe of Reddy, was able to con-
vince the Supreme Court Judge Koka Subba Rao that the decision of the
government headed by Sanjeeva Reddy was politically motivated. It was on
these grounds that Sanfeeva Reddy finally resigned his Chief Ministership
in 1964.
95An old, unwanted Kamma Congressman in the Krishna district politics,
6. Brahmayya, was made P.C.C. President so that he would not be of any threat
to his leadership. These conferences will provide the Party members with
some activity, close contacts with the Ministers and other important Party
leaders and with government machinery as such. Almost any important con-
ferences that took place in the State were held in Circar districts.
9°Alluri Satyanarayana Raju, who was the Secretary of A.I.C.C. and a
close friend of the A.I.C.C. President, Indira Gandhi, suggested Sanjeeva
Reddy' s name as the "most suitable candidate of the A.I.C.C." in 1960 with
an object of his replacing Sanjeeva Reddy in State leadership. As the
Banglore session of A.I.C.C, (where Sanjeeva Reddy would be elected A^I.C.C.
President), was approaching, Alluri was canvassing in the State, particularly
in the Circars, making the river water dispute issue his main slogan and
"rallying cry". The Circar districts would be most drastically affected if
the river water dispute went against the State. This enabled Alluri to win
over the majority of Sanjeeva Reddy men and bring together the anti-Sanjeeva
Reddy forces for a while.
117
97
The Issue was one of the reasons that contributed to the Andhra
M.P.'s working against Horarji in first and second leadership transitions
at the Center. Horarji being a Finance Minister had replied "no funds"
while sanctioning funds for Madras and Gujarat, to the then State Finance
Minister Kasu. After using the issue as a "rallying cry" for the 1967
elections, Kasu was successful in getting that bridge sanctioned immediately
after the elections as promised to the leaders and voters in the area.
Kasu was also happy when he successfully pursued the Center for financing
the bridge, that he immediately rushed to Hyderabad from New Delhi to dis-
close the "happy news" through a surprise Press conference.
98See for details: The Hindu
.
(Madras), "Political Undertones of Steel
Plant Issue," November 29, 1966.
"ibid.
10 The Times of India
.
(Bombay), November 18, 1966.
1Q1
The Hindu
.
(Madras), November 29, 1966.
109
,LW,fcIn Vijayawada City there was a steel statue of Professor N.G. Ranga
and Praksam erected in 1955. Sanjeeva Reddy was making every attempt to
get his statue installed in that important city of Andhra politics. But
until 1963-1964, no one came forward. Then an anonymous association
(Sanjeeva Reddy Seve Dal) was formed to install his statue. When L.B.
Sastry, the then Prime Minister, came to Guntur for the A.I.C.C. meeting,
he agreed to install the statue. But on the day, upon studying the mood
of the people and controversy and agitations going on, he cancelled his
itinerary to Vijayawada. The statue was under police guard for two months
night and day.
ICoMadrag an(j MySore States were also pressing the Center for the location
of this fifth steel plant in their respective states. Andhra's strong point
was that an Anglo-U.S. Consortium which had conducted a survey of all the
three states' proposed sites had recommended Visakapatnam. But the Center
could not make any decision primarily because of cross-pressures from the
aspiring states. The Congress M.L.A. f s, without mentioning Sanjeeva Reddy's
name in the Legislative Assembly, indirectly accused him of neglecting the
State to keep his own position in the Center. Tenneti Viswanatham more
directly named Sanjeeva Reddy in his speech in the Assembly as responsible
for Andhra not getting the steel plant.
104Selig Harrison, op_. cit., p. 14.
^Kasu tried to appoint Dr. P. Narasimha Rao, a Kamma renowned educationa-
list from the Guntur as Vice-Chancellor of Osmania University, to display that
he was not an anti-Kamma and to win over the strong anti-Kasu elements, who
were the followers of Congress Raghuramaiah and Swatantra Ranga in his native
Guntur district. This appointment was further aimed at balancing what Sanjeeva
Reddy did for the same vice-chancellorship by appointing a Rayalassema Reddi.
Now Kasu attempted unsuccessfully to appoint a Circar Kamma to that same post.
118
Paul Brass, op_. cit.
,
p. 58.
*"'K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, an opponent of Sanjeevayya in Kurnool district
politics was rewarded after the 1967 elections as a minister without his
being a member of any of the lower or upper houses. Many reports confirm
that this "reward" was also for his contribution to the defeat of Union
Minister Sanfeevayya.
108por details of the convention please see: The Hindu . (Madras),
November 10, 1966.
109For details see: "Reddy Offers to Quit: Steel Plant," The Times of
India
.
(Bombay), November 20, 1966, and The Hindu . (Madras), November 20, 1966.
U0Ibid.
lllnLeader's Feud Threat to Andhra Congress," The Weekly Hindustan Times .
October 27, 1966.
112
"Dispersal Cult, Roots of Regionalism," The Times of India . (Bombay),
November 30, 1966.
113
The_Hindu, (Madras), December 27, 1966.
*
^Andhra Pradesh has been demanding for the last four or five years a
separate railway zone to the State as the State was then divided between
three railway zones. As long as Sanjewa Reddy was in State politics, it
was not approved by the Center. Upon the State's increased pressure after
Kasu became the Chief Minister, the Center finally created a new zone on
October 2, 1966.
l5Some local newspapers even reported that Kasu indirectly supported
the agitation over the steel plant. Amruta Rao, belonging to Gandhi Mission,
who undertook a fast lasting over 20 days, leading to paralyzation of normal
life, and went from Kasu's Guntur to Vizag.
U6Hugh Gray, op.% cit.. p. 34.
117Paul Brass, op., cit .. p. 236.
118The Times of India
.
(Bombay), January 28, 1967.
U9Ibid.
120See for detail: Andhra Prabha
. (Vijayawada), January 16, 1967. The
government announced that from January 26, 1967, Telugu would be used as
the official language at all levels.
121When Mrs. Indira Gandhi was on tour in the State, the Jan Sangh
volunteers made every bid to disturb her meetings in Hyderabad on the
cow protection issue.
119
122The Hindu
.
(Madras), February 3, 1967.
123See for details of the C.P.I, resolution on cow protection and its
secretary Mohit Sen statement in Andhra Prabha . (Vijayawada), December 8,
1966.
The Deccon Chronicle
.
(Secundrabad), December 25, 1966.
125Phlllip Talbot, "The Second General Elections, Voting in the States,"
American University Field Staff Reports . Vol. I-VI, pp. 5-9.
126B. Nageswar Rao, "Rift Ridden Congress May Lose Majority in State,"
The Deccon Chronicle
.
(Secundrabad), February 13, 1967, p. 1.
127The Deccon Chronicle
.
(Secundrabad), February 13, 1967.
128x
^°For a Lok Sabha seat the deposit was rupees 1,000 and for the Assembly
it was 500 rupees. In the case of reserved constituencies it was 500 and
250, respectively. However, the A.P.C.C. returned more than half of the
money it collected to those who were not given its ticket.
129»a. c. Subba Reddy to Try for Leadership," The Hindu
.
(Madras),
January 3, 1967.
13 The Overseas Hindustan Times
.
(New Delhi), February 16, 1967.
^"Electioneering Has Become Costlier," The Hindu Weekly Review
.
(New
Delhi), January 23, 1967.
132Ibid.
133The Hindu, (Madras), February 7, 1967. The news item also reveals
that between August, 1961, and March, 1966, the Registrar of Companies had
showed a sum of rupees 1.27 crores as a contribution of companies to political
parties. Of that sum, Congress* share was rupees 1.09 crores and Swatantra
1.6 million. The remainder was distributed between 12 political parties.
•
^The Indian Express
.
(Vijayawada), December 5, 1966.
135Sirsikar, op. cit .. p. 169.
136Bhaskara Rao N., "Communication System (Ceylon, India, Nepal)," (A
seminar paper read at the Political Science Department, Kansas State Univer-
sity, March, 1967), p. 4.
13
'Cycle and star were the election symbols of independents and Swantra
Party, respectively.
138The Deccon Chronicle , (Secundrabad), February 13, 1967.
140
It is known that the Congress leaders had assured Mr. Naidu that he
would be nominated to Rajya Sabha if he contested against Ranga.
1952 48.6
1957 29.96
1962 24.2
120
^For details on this please see: The Andhra Patrika . (Vijayawada),
February 11, 1962, p. 4.
^2The all India percentages of votes polled by independents were:
Lok Sabha Assembly
50.59
32.96
26.53
143
The New York Times . March 5, 1967, p. 5, col. 1.
44John Grigg, Manchester Guardian Weekly . December 16, 1967, p. 6.
145The Times of India . (Bombay), May 9, 1967, p. 12.
*46M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, (eds.), The Electoral Process .
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 55.
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1965), p. 290.
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.), The Politics of the
Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press, 1961).
149D. Sitaram, Link Weekly
.
(New Delhi), April 9, 1967, p. 15.
"°The changed atmosphere of "crossing the floors" after the 1967 elections
in other State Assemblies had further smoothed the way in this direction.
As a first step in that direction, the dissident leader, A. C, who was
refused any place in the new Ministry, was favorably reconsidered by the
first week in April.
151William J. Foltz, "The Politics of the Developing Nations," in, Lewis
P. Fickett, Jr. (ed.), Problems of the Developing Nations
.
(New York: Thomas
Y. Crowe 11 Co., 1966), p. 129.
^^Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political
Stability in India," Dissent . (Spring, 1961), pp. 172-184. On the concept of
"mobilization" see also: Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review
. (1961), pp. 493-514.
Almond and Coleman, op_. cit .. Selig Harrison, "Caste and Andhra
Communists," American Political Science Review, (June, 1956), p. 378.
John Grigg, Manchester Guardian Weekly
.
March 9, 1967.
156Hugh Gray, op_. cit .. p. 34.
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The world's largest democracy went to the polls during February 1967.
The electorate In India's fourth general election since independence—250
million—is larger than the total population of the United States of America
or of Western Europe. One of the greatest achievements of Free India has un-
doubtedly been the way and the manner in which four general elections were
held. Yet it is surprising, though few studies have been done, that such an
inspiring phenomenon in world's largest democracy has gone unnoticed particularly
by political scientists and academic analysts.
The first general election of 1951-52 was an unfamiliar experience to
both voters, parties and election officers. The issues before the electorate
during the 1957 and 1962 general elections and the mid- term State wide
elections held in between were almost crystal clear. The mid-term and the
second general elections were deeply affected by the controversy over the
creation of linguistic states and its aftermath. In the 1962 third general
election, however, there were no issues which evoked powerful interest in
the general mass of voters; but the towering personality of Nehru was still
there. It was only the recent fourth general election that was free of any
such a "bias" and, in view of many observers, provided an accurate barometer
of the developing tendencies in Indian political life after Nehru.
The decision to carry out the study with reference to Andhra Pradesh
State was taken on several grounds. The decisive factor was the author's
imtimate personal knowledge of Andhra politics. In the study of any election,
the knowledge of the local political party machinery, leaders, voters and
of the setting of the elections naturally will have significant importance.
Further it was thought that a study of fourth general election in Andhra
Pradesh, on various grounds, will truly reflect the general nature of political
picture that prevailed during the election period if not after the election.
2To find out the impact and significance of the much publicised aspects
of Indian polity— factionalism, eastlesm, regionalism—was one of the
objects of this study besides understanding some of the developing tendencies
as found from the elections. In addition, an attempt was made to find out
and to know the relation between the number of candidates contested for each
constituency sad the performance of the major political parties in Andhra
Pradesh.
At the outset, before plunging into the subject of the thesis, a general
review of the State of affairs in Andhra Pradesh before the February 1967
general election, and a brief background of the State was attempted in the
first three chapters for a fuller understanding of the fourth general elec-
tion in Andhra Pradesh*
By and large, the verdict of the fourth general elections in Andhra
Pradesh as well as in India, as revealed from the study, was a protest and
revolt against the old guards of power politics and the status quo. The
groupism in the Congress party Is contributing to increased competitiveness
and to the recruitment of 'new blood 1 into the body politic.
Though there are some leaders who still look forward to their caste
support, no caste in Andhra Pradesh can be said to have only one political
allegiance. Political opportunism, in fact, is often mistaken for a caste
force.
With the Panchyati Raj movement taking deep root, the control of its
bodies has become an Important factor in the general elections. In fact
the Panchyati Raj has turned State politics into an amalgam of Parlshads,
Samithis and village politics.



